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THE PROBLEM: SOCIAL PURPOSE AND CONCESSION THEORY
“Largely incomprehensible in 1990” wrote Lord Templeman of Sir
Edward Coke’s report of The Case of Sutton’s Hospital (1612).1 Yet this
case remains among the small number of still-cited pre-modern corporate
law cases. This article uses new sources to investigate Sutton’s Hospital
and corporate development in England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. By doing so, the analysis reveals overlooked connections
between the history of corporate law, and religious thought and social purpose. The recognition of these connections, in turn, challenges the received
history of pre-modern corporate law. Although this history shapes contemporary Anglo-American debates over corporate personality and purpose,
few have scrutinized its underlying assumptions.2
The outlines of the narrative are well-established. A period of special
chartering in Britain and America preceded the nineteenth century opening
of access to the corporate form. Under the earlier legal regime, states incorporated groups in response to their direct petitioning of the legislature
or monarch.3 In return for this concession, the state expected these early
corporations, which included colonial governments, charities, global trading enterprises, infrastructure companies, and municipalities, to pursue the
public good as well as the self-interested motives of the corporate members.4 Therefore, these charters often included restrictions that limited the
legitimate purposes of corporate activity. A new regime, however,
emerged during the nineteenth century in Britain and America as general
incorporation took hold and opened access to the corporate form.5 The
1. Hazell v. Hammersmith, 2 A.C. 1, 2 W.L.R. 372 (Jan. 24, 1991).
2. See David Gindis, Conceptualizing the Business Corporation: Insights from History, 16 J.
INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 569–77 (2020); see also Simon Deakin, The Corporation in Legal Studies, in
THE CORPORATION 47 (Grietje Baars & Andre Spicer eds., 2017); see also Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate Persona, 2013 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 36, 788–95 (2013); see also
David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 39 DUKE L. J. 201–62 (1990); see also Gregory A. Mark,
The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441–83
(1987).
3. See RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION, 17201844, at 18 (2000); see also PAUL D. HALLIDAY, DISMEMBERING THE BODY
POLITIC: PARTISAN POLITICS IN ENGLAND’S TOWNS, 16501730, at 38–47 (1998); see also Millon, supra note 1, at 206–207.
4. See Millon, supra note 1. See generally The Hudson’s Bay Company, Social Legitimacy, and
the Political Economy of Eighteenth-Century Empire, 75 WM. & MARY Q. 71 (2018).
5. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical
Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, The, 30 J. CORP. L. 767, 787–97 (2005); see also
Mark, supra note 1, at 1444, 1454; see also Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173–224 (1985); see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 111–14 (1977); see also David Chan Smith,
The Mid-Victorian Reform of Britain’s Company Laws and the Moral Economy of Fair Competition,
ENTERP. SOC. 1–37 (2020); see also Michael Lobban, Joint Stock Companies, in THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND. VOLUME XII, 1820–1914, PRIVATE LAW 613–673 (W. R.
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older idea that the incorporated body was an “artificial fiction” created by
law increasingly seemed out of step with new economic and political realities. Once jurists and lawyers in Europe and America understood the corporation as no longer primarily a concession from the state, they articulated alternative theories of corporate personality.
These alternatives—real entity and aggregate theories—accommodated the increasingly private and self-interested character of business corporations and their dispersed ownership.6 Otto von Gierke in Germany
stimulated perhaps the best-known discussion when he claimed corporations were not artificial creations of the state, but real entities composed
of people whose group association the state simply recognized.7 F.W.
Maitland translated Gierke’s writings for an English-language audience.
Gierke’s followers adapted this “realist” idea that the corporation was “no
fiction, no symbol, no piece of the State’s machinery . . . .” and launched
a debate whose first wave lasted into the 1920s.8 Meanwhile lawyers in
America advanced aggregate views of the corporation in which the corporation was treated as a form of partnership composed of individuals contracting among themselves.9
The consequences of these developments—both conceptual and
practical—were pivotal for the relationship between corporate purpose
and social responsibility.10 First, restrictions once explicitly written into
charters to bound corporate activity as to purpose and scope slowly fell
away and were replaced by regulatory law.11 Second, business corporations were increasingly recognized as private entities and the expectations
about public purpose that had arisen under the earlier corporate regime fell
Cornish ed., 2010); see also ROB MCQUEEN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF COMPANY LAW : GREAT BRITAIN
AND THE AUSTRALIAN COLONIES 1854-1920 (2009); see also TIMOTHY L. ALBORN, CONCEIVING
COMPANIES: JOINT-STOCK POLITICS IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND (1998); see also Henry N. Butler, General Incorporation in Nineteenth-Century England: Interaction of Common Law and Legislative Processes, 6 INT. REV. L. ECON. 169–88 (1986); see also Geoffrey Todd, Some Aspects of Joint Stock
Companies, 1844–1900, 4 ECON. HIST. REV. 46 (1932).
6. See Blair, supra note 1, at 800–16; see also Millon, supra note 1, at 216–19; see also Mark,
supra note 1, at 1442, 1445, 1457–71.
7. See Blair, supra note 1, at 805–7; see also Ron Harris, The Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality Theories: From German Codification to British Political Pluralism
and American Big Business Symposium: Understanding Corporate Law through History, 63 WASH.
LEE L. REV. 1421–1478 (2006); see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 4, at 798; see also Mark, supra note
1, at 1467–77.
8. This quote is from F.W. Maitland and his introduction to OTTO VON GIERKE, POLITICAL
THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES xxvi (Cambridge, 1900); OTTO VON GIERKE, COMMUNITY IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 105–09 (1990). The debate and its extensive literature is surveyed in David
Gindis, From Fictions and Aggregates to Real Entities in the Theory of the Firm, 5 J. INST. ECON. 25–
46 (2009).
9. Mark, supra note 1, at 1457–64.
10. Id. at 1454.
11. Mark, supra note 2, at 1442; Millon, supra note 2, at 208–09.
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away. Corporations became intermediary institutions while governmental
control took the form of regulation rather than ab initio stipulations in the
charter. The rise of large-scale, powerful industrial corporations, however,
stimulated renewed attempts to reconcile the problem of private interest
with social welfare. Real entity theory provided the basis for novel approaches to social responsibility based on corporate citizenship and trust,
most famously articulated by E. Merrick Dodd.12 With the growth of the
post-war corporatist state and the continuing influence of real entity theory, even Adolf Berle could admit that “[t]he argument has been settled
(at least for the time being) squarely in favor of Professor Dodd’s contention.”13
The resurgence of aggregate theory during the 1970s and 1980s severed these links between corporations and social responsibility. Corporations were described as a “nexus for a set of contracting relationships,” a
position advanced by the law and economics movement.14 Subsequent
changes in management thought and corporate governance emphasized
shareholder control and the reformulation of social responsibility within
the context of value producing activities.15 Corporations were decidedly
private actors under this theory. While it was assumed that social benefits
might arise in aggregate from corporate activity, corporate social responsibility should only be pursued by managers if it was ultimately in the financial interest of the shareholders.16 Most recently, however, the growing
recognition of the political influence of corporations after cases such as
Citizens United and the lively management literature on corporate social
responsibility have revived debates over corporate personhood and its relationship to social purpose.17
These historical debates over corporate personality have long held
implications for understanding the source of a corporation’s obligation to

12. See E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L REV.
1145–63 (1932); see also Millon, supra note 1, at 203, 216.
13. ADOLF BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954); see also Blair,
supra note 1, at 808.
14. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976); see also Blair, supra note 1,
at 808.
15. See Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 22 J. APPL. CORP. FIN. 32–42 (2010); see also WILLIAM BAUMOL, PERFECT MARKETS
AND EASY VIRTUE, BUSINESS ETHICS AND THE INVISIBLE HAND (1991); see also Peter F. Drucker,
The New Meaning of Corporate Social Responsibility, 26 CAL. MGMT. REV. 53–63 (1984).
16. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Profits, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970. It is now described as “enlightened shareholder value,” see Michael Jensen,
Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and Corporate Objective Function, 14 J. APPLIED CORP.
FIN. 32–42 (2005),
17. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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promote the social good.18 Reuven Avi-Yonah argued in an influential article that all three theories of corporate personality have been present over
time with emphasis among jurists shifting among them “[a]s the relationship of the corporation to the state, to society and to its members or shareholders changes.”19 During the period of special incorporation when corporate bodies were more explicitly held within the orbit of governmental
power, this closer relationship made them appear as much public as private
entities.20 In this way, the concessionary grant of the state established explicit expectations and obligations about the social responsibilities of corporations. This assumption has led to proposals to revive concession theory in order to bolster state authority to regulate corporate purpose in the
present-day.21 Attempts to establish the basis for corporate social responsibility within theories of legal personality have led other scholars to reassert real entity theory.22 In this way, the past serves as a seedbed for ideas
about the law and corporate purpose, but also poses the problem of the
need for an authentic reconstruction of historical ideas about the corporation absent of teleology or anachronism.
This article pursues this project by investigating special incorporation in sixteenth and seventeenth-century England to explore why lawyers
assumed corporations ought to provide social benefits. The analysis challenges the established narrative about corporate law during this period by
making three interconnected arguments. First, by examining the most famous corporate law case of the period, The Case of Sutton’s Hospital
(1612), the article provides a new interpretation of the case grounded in a
wider range of sources.23 This historical reconstruction demonstrates both
the incompleteness of historical knowledge of corporate thought and the
deeply teleological character of narratives that have obscured more authentic historical reconstruction. Second, the discussion of the case is the
entry point into an exploration of how contemporaries understood
18. See Millon, supra note 1, at 202; see also Blair, supra note 1, at 799; see also Mark, supra
note 1, at 1454.
19. Avi-Yonah, supra note 4, at 812.
20. See David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the Corporation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139-58 (2013); see also Blair, supra note 1, at 787, 790; see also Millon,
supra note 1, at 202 (the “public/private distinction” has been the “abidingly crucial issue in corporate
legal theory”).
21. See Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327–62, 329,
333 (2013).
22. See Stefan J. Padfield, Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory, 6 WM. &
MARY BUS. L. REV. 1–34 (2015); see also Reuvan S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate
Form, WIS. L. REV. 999 (2010); see also Gindis, supra note 7; see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, VA. L. REV. 247–328 (1999); see also William
W. Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 1471–1527 (1989).
23. Sutton’s Hospital Case (1612), 10 Coke Reports, 1a-35a ER 77 937–976.
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corporations in their society as forms of government. Government and corporate theory, this article demonstrates, were deeply embedded within theological ideas. An important body of work has already established the
close links between medieval canon law and religious thought, and early
European corporate ideas.24 This article builds on these insights to pursue
a different direction, arguing that the emphasis that lawyers and judges
placed on government in Sutton’s Hospital was rooted in theological assumptions about order. Finally, this article’s final section uses this analysis
to sketch a different narrative of corporate history in which the key event
was not the emergence of the paradigmatic for-profit shareholder corporation, but the nineteenth-century fission between for- and non-profits.
THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE EARLY MODERN ENGLISH CORPORATION
This research joins other scholarship revising accounts of the early
English corporation that are now over one hundred years old and yet often
still relied upon as definitive.25 The earlier historiography focused primarily on explaining the emergence of the joint-stock business corporation,
the development of key corporate characteristics, and the genealogy of
corporate ideas.26 Among the many contributions of these earlier
24. See AMANDA PORTERFIELD, CORPORATE SPIRIT 9–61 (2018); see also ERNST
KANTOROWICZ, THE KING’S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIAEVAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY 196–271
(1998); see also J.P. Canning, Law, Sovereignty and Corporation Theory, 1300–1450, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT C.350–C.1450 454–476, 473–476 (J. H.
Burns ed., 1 ed. 1988); see also J. P. Canning, The Corporation in the Political Thought of the Italian
Jurists of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, 1 HIST. POLIT. THOUGHT 9–32 (1980); see also
BRIAN TIERNEY, FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONCILIAR THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE MEDIEVAL
CANONISTS FROM GRATIAN TO THE GREAT SCHISM 96–140 (1968); see also M.J. Rodriguez, Innocent
IV and the Element of Fiction in Juristic Personalities, 22 JURIST 287–318 (1962).
25. See COLIN ARTHUR COOKE, CORPORATION, TRUST AND COMPANY: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL
HISTORY (1950); see also ARMAND DUBOIS, THE ENGLISH BUSINESS COMPANY AFTER THE BUBBLE
ACT, 1720–1800 (1938); see also C. E. Walker, The History of the Joint Stock Company, 6 ACCOUNT.
REV. 97–105 (1931); see also GEORGE UNWIN, THE GILDS AND COMPANIES OF LONDON (2d ed.
1925); see also W. CUNNINGHAM, THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH ENDUSTRY AND COMMERCE (1925); see
also W. S. Holdsworth, English Corporation Law in the 16th and 17th Centuries, 31 YALE L.J. 382–
407 (1922); see also Harold J. Laski, The Early History of the Corporation in England, 30 HARV. L.
REV. 561–88 (1917); see also CECIL T. CARR, SELECT CHARTERS OF TRADING COMPANIES, 1530 1707 (1913); see also 2 WILLIAM ROBERT SCOTT, THE CONSTITUTION AND FINANCE OF ENGLISH,
SCOTTISH AND IRISH JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES TO 1720 (1910); see also M. EPSTEIN, THE EARLY
HISTORY OF THE LEVANT COMPANY (1908); see also GEORGE UNWIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES (1904); see also FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND,
THE CORPORATION AGGREGATE: THE HISTORY OF A LEGAL IDEA (1893).
26. Though important work on borough corporations also exists. See BRITISH BOROUGH
CHARTERS 1307–1660, (Martin Weinbaum ed., 1943); see also C. Patterson, Quo Warranto and Borough Corporations in Early Stuart England: Royal Prerogative and Local Privileges in the Central
Courts, 120 ENGL. HIST. REV. 879–906 (2005); see also Yoh Kawana, Trade, Sociability and Governance in an English Incorporated Borough: ‘Formal’ and ‘Informal’ Worlds in Leicester, c. 1570–
1640, 33 URBAN HIST. 324–49 (2006). Of great interest to these earlier historians was the relationship
of English corporate ideas to continental developments and the identification of indigenous innovation,
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investigators was the recognition that guild and municipal corporations
provided an intellectual foundation for the regulation of group life and
economic affairs, and ultimately for the emergence of the business corporation.27 Thus, the incorporation of merchant groups abroad during the fifteenth century made use of guild models that were further expanded upon
in the sixteenth-century foundation of the Muscovy Company (1551–5)
and then the East India Company (1600).28
This literature also argued that the emergence of the early modern
nation-state was crucial to the evolution of the corporate economy. The
state used incorporation during the sixteenth century to control groups
through the concession of privileges and to create a national market better
attuned to capitalist production.29 The growth of incorporation during the
sixteenth century consequently marked the transition from an older system
of guild self-regulation to a more closely monitored concession from the
state.30 Because governments held the power to withhold chartering, they
were supposedly able to demand that such corporations take into account
the public interest. But the state’s touch was, in time, withering. While
advantageous for English competitiveness in the seventeenth century,
rent-seeking and special chartering ultimately restricted corporate development, especially after the passage of the Bubble Act (1720).31 Innovation proceeded through self-organization, such as unincorporated companies and the equity courts, until nineteenth century liberalization and the
emergence of the modern business corporation.32
This narrative of the development of the corporation continues to be
mapped onto assumptions about the period’s economic thinking. Government recognition of incorporated economic bodies of tradespersons and
merchants aided the emergence of more integrated national and international economies while also achieving mercantilist goals.33 Ron Harris, for
see 2 SCOTT, supra note 25, at 2–3; see also C.T. Carr, Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History,
3 166–82, 167 (1907); see also M. Schmitthoff, The Origin of the Joint-Stock Company, 3 U. TOR.
L.J. 74 (1939).
27. See UNWIN, supra note 25; see also SCOTT, supra note 25, at 3–10; see also Laski, supra
note 25, at 578–81.; see also Heinz Lubasz, The Corporate Borough in the Common Law of the Late
Yearbook Period, 80 L. Q. REV. 228–43, 229–30 (1964).
28. SCOTT, supra note 25, at 13–15.
29. See Holdsworth, supra note 25, at 383; see also CUNNINGHAM, supra note 25, at 523.
30. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 25, at 513–25; see also Laski, supra note 25, at 571–73, 582,
584.
31. “An Act for Securing Certain Powers and Privileges,” 6 George I, c. 18, 8 THE STATUTES AT
LARGE, OF ENGLAND AND OF GREAT-BRITAIN, 322–38 (John Raithby ed., 1811).
32. See Joshua Getzler & Mike Macnair, The Firm as an Entity Before the Companies Acts, in
ADVENTURES OF THE LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY CONFERENCE
267–88 (W.N. Osborough, Paul Brand, & Kevin Costello eds., 2003); see also DUBOIS, supra note
25, at 120–307.
33. See UNWIN, supra note 25,at 255–56; see also COOKE, supra note 25, at 52–54.
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example, notes in the second half of the sixteenth century that the corporate form was more frequently “used for profit-oriented organization of
business,” but that the evolution of the corporation was restricted because
it was a “medieval legal conception … nested in a mercantilist era.”34
Since the crown often granted trading companies monopolistic privileges,
these corporations were instruments of the mercantilist policies supposedly dominate in the period—though “mercantilism” was not a term used
during the seventeenth century.35 Courtiers and rent-seekers soon appropriated monopolistic privileges and especially after the passage of the Statute of Monopolies (1623), used the corporate vehicle to control specific
markets, such as comb making and soap production.36 Their conventional
justification was that the corporation and its monopoly served a public
purpose, usually the regulation and “ordering” of a market or profession,
but, as C.A. Cooke put it, “What was legally the purpose of order and good
government had become in practical effect the pursuit of private gain.”37
Only over a long period of time through a “transition from public jurisdiction to private profit,” did the trading corporation, originally a mercantilist
tool, slowly lose its social purpose and the modern economic corporation
emerge.38
This established narrative focuses on the evolution of the paradigmatic joint-stock company and its private organization of capital.39 Nonprofit corporates are important only as the protean bed of basic corporate
characteristics. The business corporation emerges from them and not
alongside them, coming to maturity in the nineteenth century. This is also
a teleological narrative in other ways, in which the economic corporation
emerges from state control to unleash economic growth during nineteenthcentury liberalization and ultimately to assume its place as the most prominent form of business organization.
34. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 39, 45.
35. For the debate over applying the term to the economic thought of the period, see Steven C.
A. Pincus, Rethinking Mercantilism: Political Economy, the British Empire, and the Atlantic World in
the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 69 WM. & MARY Q. 3–34 (2012); see also D. C. Coleman,
Mercantilism Revisited, 23 HIST. J. 773 (1980).
36. See HARRIS, supra note 2, at 41, 46; see also Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism,
and the Politics of Regulation, VA. LAW REV. 1313–79, 1342–70 (2005); see also JOAN THIRSK,
ECONOMIC POLICY AND PROJECTS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CONSUMER SOCIETY IN EARLY MODERN
ENGLAND 51–105 (1978). Examples of these incorporations can be found in University of Oxford,
Bodleian Library Bankes MS 12.
37. COOKE, supra note 25, at 51–2; Avi-Yonah, supra note 4, at 784; Samuel Williston, History
of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 105–24, 110–11 (1888).
38. COOKE, supra note 25, at 61; HARRIS, supra note 2, at 58–59.
39. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439–68 (2000); Replies by historians include, T. Guinnane et al., Putting the Corporation in its
Place, 8 ENTERP. SOC. 687–729 (2007); see also Leslie Hannah, The Origins, Characteristics and
Resilience of the “Anglo-American” Corporate Model, 33 ESSAYS ECON. BUS. HIST. 1–25 (2015).
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Since this triumph is assumed to be the ultimate end-state of corporate development, the earlier history of special incorporation appears as
one of retarded growth or simply static conceptual development. As early
as 1925, the legal historian W.S. Holdsworth observed “that the corporation is to be treated as far as possible like a natural man is the only theory
about the personality of corporations that the common law has ever possessed.”40 Avi-Yonah has more recently argued that the early modern period was “one of relative stability in the development of the corporate
form.”41 Citing Sutton’s Hospital, he notes that the “real entity
view . . . prevailed throughout this period . . . .”42 Ultimately, English lawyers were stuck with a corporate form increasingly at odds with the economic realities around them. Their inability or unwillingness to innovate
led to long-term consequences, such as a lack of clarity about whether
shareholders are owners of a corporation or simply have a bundle of governance and profit-sharing rights. For example, David Ciepley’s investigation into the East India Company argued that the association of shareholders with ownership followed from the failure of English lawyers to
receive property theories of the corporation.43 Ciepley concludes that
“[t]he business corporation was a fundamentally different kind of corporation than the medieval church, state, and guild . . . and so [it] should not
have been conceptualized as a ‘body politic,’ but as a more incorporeal
kind of legal person.”44 These assumptions about a static conceptual world
trapped in the mercantilist past, turns the period of special incorporation
into a foil for the opening of the period of liberal change during the nineteenth-century.
REVISIONISM AND THE HISTORY OF CORPORATE LAW
Recent legal and historical scholarship has begun to question these
narratives and their assumptions.45 First, the problem of how English
40. Holdsworth, supra note 25, at 406.
41. Avi-Yonah, supra note 4, at 783.
42. Avi-Yonah, supra note 4, at 783. See also Frederick Pollock, Has the Common Law Received
the Fiction Theory of Corporations, 27 L. Q. REV. 219–35 (1911).
43. David Ciepley, The Anglo-American Misconception of Stockholders as ‘Owners’ and ‘Members’: Its Origins and Consequences, 16 J. INST. ECON. 623–42 (2020). This literature includes, LYNN
STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS,
CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012); Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v.
Ford, 3 VA. L. BUS. REV. 164–90 (2008).
44. Ciepley, supra note 43, at 629.
45. Important recent accounts include, RON HARRIS, GOING THE DISTANCE: EURASIAN TRADE
AND THE RISE OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION 1400-1700 (2019); WILLIAM A. PETTIGREW,
FREEDOM’S DEBT THE ROYAL AFRICAN COMPANY AND THE POLITICS OF THE ATLANTIC SLAVE
TRADE, 1672-1752 (2016); Philip J. Stern, “Bundles of Hyphens”: Corporations as Legal Communities in the Early Modern British Empire, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND EMPIRES, 1500-1850 21–48 (Lauren Benton & Richard J. Ross eds., 2013); PHILIP J. STERN, THE COMPANY-STATE: CORPORATE

376

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 45:367

lawyers theorized the corporation during the early modern period is being
reopened. There was vigorous debate about corporate ideas among lawyers during the period rather than consensus. Hans Lubasz’s early reading
of fifteenth and early sixteenth-century corporate cases, especially the extensive discussion in Abbot of St Benet Hulme v. Mayor etc. of Norwich
(1481-3), led him to assert that, broadly speaking, “we are justified in
speaking of a common law theory of corporations.”46 However, differing
conceptions of the corporation among medieval English lawyers did not
simply correspond to modern theories: “Year Book lawyers seem not to
have held either a pure fictionist theory of [the] corporation or anything
like the pure realist theory. . . .”47 When David Seipp recently revisited this
material, he likewise concluded that while he could “find distinct, persistent patterns of two types of opposing arguments,” there was no dogmatic
adherence to one or another theory of corporate personality among lawyers.48 Fifteenth and sixteenth-century lawyers instead had a practical orientation, preserving a range of corporate ideas.49 Their practicality also led
to the assumption that corporations aggregate were ultimately composed
of real people as a fifteenth-century commentator, for example, explained:
“A town in itself is no corporation, and cannot be so.”50 A corporation was
ultimately inseparable from those persons who composed it because if the
“mayor and commonalty . . . were in some other place, the city or town
would be nothing but an empty thing.”51 Sources like these led Lubasz to
conclude that, to these lawyers, “the corporation is simply the community
in its legal form, in its legal aspect. Its hallmark in this respect is not entity
but capacity.”52
Second, legal scholars have begun to analyze the non-economic influence of corporations in early modern society, departing from a focus on
the development of the business corporation and its economic effects. This
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE EARLY MODERN FOUNDATIONS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA (2012);
JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A
REVOLUTIONARY IDEA (2005); HARRIS, supra note 2.
46. Lubasz, supra note 27, at 243
47. Id. at 236.
48. David J. Seipp, Formalism and Realism in Fifteenth-Century English Law: Bodies Corporate
and Bodies Natural, in JUDGES AND JUDGING IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW :
FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 37–50 (Joshua Getzler & Paul Brand eds., 2012); and similarly,
Susan Reynolds, The History of the Idea of Incorporation or Legal Personality : A case of Fallacious
Teleology, in IDEAS AND SOLIDARITIES OF THE MEDIEVAL LAITY : ENGLAND AND WESTERN EUROPE.
ED. REYNOLDS, SUSAN 1–20 (1995).
49. Seipp, supra note 48, at 50.
50. JOHN SPELMAN, JOHN SPELMAN’S READING ON “QUO WARRANTO”: DELIVERED IN GRAY’S
INN, LENT 1519 4 (J. Baker ed., 1998).
51. Id. at 4–5; Possibly echoing a claim by the medieval jurist Accursius, Canning, supra note
24, at 12–3.
52. Lubasz, supra note 27, at 241.
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line of inquiry has fruitfully revised traditional interpretations of the political world of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as straightforwardly
state-centered. In this older narrative, the key event is the expansion of the
nation state and unitary sovereignty. Newer interpretations cast this process as more subtle, compromised and even incomplete. The early modern
world was pluralist and composed of fragmented jurisdictions. Even as
nation-states developed, they often did not uniformly consolidate jurisdictions, but rather asserted themselves through a negotiated, “diffuse sovereignty.”53 Thus, for example, Gregory Ablavsky finds in the dual structure
of eighteenth-century American federalism not a rejection of unitary sovereignty, but rather a form of centralization.54 Set against the backdrop of
a world “with a complex patchwork of local institutions with independent
authority,” American constitutional development at both the state and federal level sought to restrain “competing claimants to authority within state
borders – corporations, local institutions, . . . ”55 In this telling, corporations were manifestly political institutions not under the easy control of
nation-building states, but sometimes competitors, sometimes partners, or
part of the larger matrix of government.56 Similarly, by focusing on the
political status of early modern corporations, other scholars such as Nikolas Bowie have demonstrated how charter writing influenced early American constitutional ideas.57 Literature in both corporate law and management studies have similarly returned to an analysis of the political character of corporate organization over time.58
53. See Greg Ablavsky, Empire States: The Coming of Dual Federalism, 56, 1796; see also Lauren Benton & Richard J. Ross, Empires and Legal Pluralism Jurisdiction, Sovereignty, and Political
Imagination in the Early Modern World, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND EMPIRES, 1500–1850 1–17 (Lauren Benton & Richard J. Ross eds., 2013).
54. Lubasz, supra note 26.
55. Ablavsky, supra note 53, at 1796.
56. Id. at 1818. For a discussion of institutional competition in Europe during the early modern
period, see HENDRIK SPRUYT, THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND ITS COMPETITORS: AN ANALYSIS OF
SYSTEMS CHANGE (1996).
57. Nikolas Bowie, Why the Constitution Was Written Down, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1397–1508
(2019).
58. See CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Naomi Lamoreaux & William J. Novak
eds., 2017); see also Ciepley, supra note 20; see also DANIEL J. H. GREENWOOD, The Semi-Sovereign
Corporation, (2005), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=757315 (last visited April 28, 2022); the literature on “political CSR” and corporate political activity is large, but surveys include Andreas Georg
Scherer, Theory Assessment and Agenda Setting in Political CSR: A Critical Theory Perspective, 20
INT. J. MANAG. REV. 387–410 (2018); see also Jędrzej George Frynas & Siân Stephens, Political
Corporate Social Responsibility: Reviewing Theories and Setting New Agendas, 17 INT. J. MANAG.
REV. 483–509 (2015); see also Thomas Lawton, Steven McGuire & Tazeeb Rajwani, Corporate Political Activity: A Literature Review and Research Agenda, 15 INT. J. MANAG. REV. 86–105 (2013);
see also Glen Whelan, The Political Perspective of Corporate Social Responsibility: A Critical Research Agenda, 22 BUS. ETHICS Q. 709–737 (2012); see also A.G. Scherer & Guido Palazzo, The New
Political Role of Business in a Globalized World: A Review of a New Perspective on CSR and its
Implications for the Firm, Governance, and Democracy, 48 J. MANAG. STUD. 899–931 (2011).
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In their accounts of corporate development, historians also have
moved away from straightforward assumptions about state building. The
most recent historiography, similar to the literature in legal studies, investigates corporations as part of larger networks of negotiated power rather
than extensions or creatures of centralizing states. Discarding an earlier
generation’s top-down model of corporate evolution, this historiography
emphasizes that these corporations, including municipal, ecclesiastical,
and commercial, were political parts of a cellular early modern English
state and its “grids of power.”59 Corporations also were self-consciously
political, often with direct responsibility for administration, especially in
an imperial context. Thus, the directors of the East India Company understood their Company as a “company-state.”60
Historians have likewise explored how corporate life shaped political
institutions and culture. For Phil Withington, corporate citizenship in borough corporations was part of an experience of self-government that provided the constituent parts of the English commonwealth with their peculiar autonomy and constitutional culture.61 This research is a reminder of
the dynamism of the period’s corporate form and the creativity of its lawyers. Incorporators used corporations for a multitude of practical purposes,
including colonization, business, charity, and municipal administration.62
Business corporations were only a small subset of corporate types in England and its Atlantic world.
As legal scholars and historians have begun to probe the political
meaning of corporate life, they have also highlighted a characteristic of
these early corporations that was remarked upon by even the earliest historiography: the role of the corporation in early modern society as a form
of government.63 But what did this mean to contemporaries, and how did
this shape their expectations about social purpose? This is the key question
this article interrogates as it reconstructs the corporate theory of the period
of Sutton’s Hospital.

59. See M. J. Braddick & John Walter, Introduction: Grids of Power; Order, Hierarchy, and
Subordination in Early Modern Society, in NEGOTIATING POWER IN EARLY MODERN SOCIETY:
ORDER, HIERARCHY AND SUBORDINATION IN BRITAIN AND IRELAND 38–40 (2001); see also MICHAEL
J BRADDICK, STATE FORMATION IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND, CA. 1550–1700 19 (2000); see also
STEVE HINDLE, THE STATE AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND, C.1550–1640 16–28
(2000).
60. Philip J. Stern, “A Politie of Civill & Military Power” : Political Thought and the Late Seventeenth-Century Foundations of the East India Company-State, 47 J. BR. STUD. 253–83 (2008).
61. PHIL WITHINGTON, THE POLITICS OF COMMONWEALTH: CITIZENS AND FREEMEN IN EARLY
MODERN ENGLAND 7–13 (2008).
62. Stern, supra note 44, at 23–24, 27–28.
63. Id.at 32–37.
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EARLY MODERN GOVERNMENT AND THE CASE OF SUTTON’S HOSPITAL
The meaning of corporate government was crucial to The Case of
Sutton’s Hospital (1612) and provides an opportunity to explore this idea
so conventionally repeated throughout the early modern period in England. Sutton’s Hospital is arguably the oldest, still-cited case in AngloAmerican corporate law.64 Knowledge of the case depends on the report
by the prominent judge and lawyer Sir Edward Coke.65 Coke explicitly
published his report of the proceedings in 1614 to clarify the law related
to charitable corporations.66 His didacticism has made the case a convenient statement of legal ideas about corporations during the period, and
modern commentators have claimed that Coke’s account “settled for later
centuries the general English legal theory of corporations.”67 Discussions
of corporate law during the seventeenth and eighteenth-centuries frequently referred to the case, and other authorities such as William Blackstone used Sutton’s Hospital as an authority throughout his account of corporate law.68
Coke’s report of Sutton’s Hospital is famous, in particular, for his
definition of the corporation. Though not original to him, this is something
of a potent quotable and has entered into popular critiques of the “sociopathic” corporation. The corporation, according to Coke, is, “ . . . invisible, immortal, and rests only in intendment and consideration of the
law . . . [corporations] have no souls, neither can they appear in person,
but by attorney . . . ”69 The soulless corporation was an artifice of law with
a separate legal existence from its members.70 Blackstone paraphrased
64. For example, U.S. v. Detroit Med. Ctr., 833 F.3d 671 (6th Cir. 2016); Liberty Northwest Ins.
v. Oregon Ins. Guarantee, 136 P.3d 49 (Or. Ct. App. 2006); SEC v. John Adams Trust Corp., 697 F.
Supp. 573 (D. Mass. 1988); Commonwealth v. McIllwain, 1979 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2452, 270 Pa.
Super. 612, 417 A.2d 777 (Pa. Super. Ct. January 1, 1979); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 743
(1972); recently in Canada by the Supreme Court, Communities Econ. Dev. Fund v. Canadian Pickles
Corp. (1991), 3 SCR 388, at 401.
65. Sutton’s Hospital Case (1612), 10 Coke Rep., 1b ER 77 937, 960. The major historiography
on Coke includes DAVID CHAN SMITH, SIR EDWARD COKE AND THE REFORMATION OF THE LAWS:
RELIGION, POLITICS AND JURISPRUDENCE, 1578–1616 (2014); ALLEN D. BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE
AND THE ELIZABETHAN AGE (2003); CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE
LIFE AND TIMES OF SIR EDWARD COKE (1552–1634) (1957).
66. Sutton’s Hospital Case (1612), 10 Coke Rep., 35a ER 77, 976.
67. COOKE, supra note 25, at 66. Williston, supra note 37 ,at 113. Holdsworth, supra note 25, at
382.
68. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, THE OXFORD EDITION OF BLACKSTONE: COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 1, 306–10 (Wilfrid Prest & David Lemmings eds., 2016).
69. 10 Coke Rep. 32 b, 77 ER 973. Coke himself suggested that he had the definition from Sir
Roger Manwood (1525-1592), chief baron of the Exchequer, see Tipling v. Pexall (1614) 2 Bulstrode
233, 80 ER 1085.
70. See Laski, supra note 25, at 587; see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 22, at 1002. For discussions
of the influence of the “soulless” corporation and attempts to shift this language, see ROLAND
MARCHAND, CREATING THE CORPORATE SOUL : THE RISE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS AND CORPORATE
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Coke’s definition, and John Marshall, without identifying his source explicitly, declared in the Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward
(1819):
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing
only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers
upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.71

Though influential as a statement of the law of corporations of the
period, there have, in fact, been few scholarly investigations of Sutton’s
Hospital. Henry Turner has recently argued that the case demonstrated a
conflict between two different theories of corporate personality and that
“the question before the court was whether an artificial person could displace a natural person as heir to one of the wealthiest citizens in England.”72 In contrast, a more extensive reading of the sources for Sutton’s
Hospital suggests not only different arguments made by each side, but that
the question of government was the key issue in the decision.
SUTTON’S HOSPITAL AND THE CHALLENGE OF HISTORICAL CORPORATE
LAW SOURCES
Sutton’s Hospital provides an apt example of the problem of sources
in the history of corporate law. All readings of the case have relied upon
the single report published by Coke, who was involved in the hospital in
ways that would now implicate significant conflicts-of-interest, including
as one of its governors. However, prior to the nineteenth century in England, most reports of cases were unpublished. After the ending of the anonymous Year Books in 1535, reports of cases depended on the circulation
of the scribbled reports of lawyers, law students, and judges, and their occasional printing.73 Lawyers penned their reports during the sixteenth and
IMAGERY IN AMERICAN BIG BUSINESS 7-10 et passim (1998); see also EUGENE MCCARRAHER, THE
ENCHANTMENTS OF MAMMON: HOW CAPITALISM BECAME THE RELIGION OF MODERNITY 196–209
(2019).
71. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819), 636; BLACKSTONE, supra
note 68, at 1, 309; Avi-Yonah, supra note 4, at 787–88.
72. HENRY S. TURNER, THE CORPORATE COMMONWEALTH: PLURALISM AND POLITICAL
FICTIONS IN ENGLAND 1516-1651 14, (2017).
73. See W. Hamilton Bryson, Law Reporting in the Seventeenth Century, in ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY AND ITS SOURCES: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR JOHN BAKER 44–3, 44–5 (D. J. Ibbetson, Neil
Jones, & Nigel Ramsay eds., 2019); see also John Baker, Law Reporting in England 1550–1650, 45
INT. J. LEG. INF. 209–18, (2017); see also Alain Alexandre Wijffels & D. J. Ibbetson, Case Law in the
Making, in CASE LAW IN THE MAKING : THE TECHNIQUES AND METHODS OF JUDICIAL RECORDS AND
LAW REPORTS 13–35, 28–33 (1997); see also D. J. Ibbetson, Report and Record in Early-Modern
Common Law, in CASE LAW IN THE MAKING : THE TECHNIQUES AND METHODS OF JUDICIAL
RECORDS AND LAW REPORTS 55–68 (Alain Alexandre Wijffels ed., 1997); see also David J. Ibbetson,
Law Reporting in the 1590s, in LAW REPORTING IN BRITAIN 74–88, 80–4 (Chantal Stebbings ed.,
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seventeenth-century reports in Law French, a technical language derived
from Norman French.74 Oral remembrance and the circulation of these
manuscript reports met many of the small profession’s needs for accounts
of cases during a period when precedential authority was still emerging.75
Publishers printed some of these reports, especially those by leading practitioners.76 However, only a small percentage—and very few, for example,
for the eighteenth-century—of these reports made their way into print.77
Coke’s Reports were among them and, due to his professional reputation
during his lifetime, lawyers quickly adopted them for citation.78 Coke
wrote explicitly to continue the project of Edmund Plowden, whose Commentaries were published in 1571, to provide authoritative reports to reveal the “right reason and rule of the judges” in controverted cases.79 That
is, Coke was not providing an objective account of arguments in cases, but
rather he used the reports to present his understanding of what the law
actually was during a period when legal change had been rapid and a cause
of confusion for practitioners.80
There are also at least three manuscript reports of The Case of Sutton’s Hospital and they provide different accounts of arguments and judicial discussion. They are also less obviously partial than Coke’s version.
In addition, there are case notes from the hospital’s counsel surviving in
the London Metropolitan Archive—a rare find for the period.81 The arguments in the case, in fact, became so detailed on both sides that a “paper
Book” containing “eight score sheets of paper” was produced of them, although this book has not been found.82 This manuscript evidence provides
1995); see also W. Hamilton Bryson, Law Reports in England from 1603 to 1660, in LAW REPORTING
IN BRITAIN 113–22, 114–19 (Chantal Stebbings ed., 1995); see also JOHN HAMILTON BAKER,
JUDICIAL RECORDS, LAW REPORTS, AND THE GROWTH OF CASE LAW (1989); see also James Oldham,
Eighteenth-Century Judges’ Notes: How They Explain, Correct and Enhance the Reports, 31 AM. J.
LEG. HIST. 9–42 (1987); see also L. W. ABBOTT, LAW REPORTING IN ENGLAND 1485–1585 (1973).
74. Ibbetson, supra note 73, at 56–57.
75. See Ian Williams, Law, Language and the Printing Press in the Reign of Charles I: Explaining the Printing of the Common Law in English, 38 L. HIST. REV. 339–71 (2020); see also Wijffels
and Ibbetson, supra note 73, at 28–29; see also Ian Williams, Early-Modern Judges and the Practice
of Precedent, in JUDGES AND JUDGING IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW 51–66
(Paul Brand & Joshua Getzler eds., 2011).
76. Bryson, supra note 73, at 114–19.
77. See Ibbetson, supra note 73, at 80–81.
78. Bryson, Law Reporting in the Seventeenth Century, supra note 73, at 45.
79. EDWARD COKE, THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE 1, p. xxvii (J. H. Thomas & John Farquhar Fraser eds., 1826). See generally SMITH, supra note 65; J. H. Baker, Coke’s Note-Books and the
Sources of his Reports, 30 CAMB. L.J. 59–86 (1972); and Theodore F.T. Plucknett, The Genesis of
Coke’s Reports, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 190–213 (1942) for discussion of Coke’s reporting practices.
80. See Baker, Law Reporting in England, supra note 73, at 215.
81. See London Metro. Archives ACC/1876/L/02/25, 35–40; see also Yelverton’s notes in “Mr
Yelverton’s Argument in the Case of Suttons Hospital,” Brit. Libr. Hargrave MS 15, ff. 45–54.
82. Instructions For a Motion, London Metro. Archives ACC/1876/L/02/25.
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new insights into Sutton, revealing both the wider context and history of
the case, and demonstrating that Coke’s claims about corporate fictions
were not important to the decision. While lawyers used both “realist” and
“formalist” arguments, the manuscript reports demonstrate that the judges
focused on the governmental status of the body politic to determine
whether the corporation had come into existence.
WHAT WAS A CORPORATION IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND?
Corporate ideas were still in flux when the arguments were made in
Sutton’s Hospital. Coke’s confident recounting of the rules applied in Sutton’s Hospital obscures a legal world that was still pioneering its intellectual exploration into corporate theory. Even though the term “corporation”
appears in the medieval Year Books beginning in 1429 and lawyers had
debated the powers, capacity, and personality of incorporated groups since
the fifteenth century, common law learning about corporations was still
“uncertain” in the early sixteenth century.83 This was partly due to the variety of corporate types. One serjeant-at-law joked in 1519 that “[d]efining
the qualities of a corporation” might take weeks on account that “there are
various kinds of corporation, and their qualities are different.”84 Over the
century lawyers faced increasing analytical challenges with the emergence
of newer corporate forms such as professional societies and trading corporations, and as the overall number of incorporations grew.85 For example,
while there were only 38 incorporated towns in 1500, by 1600 there were
130 in existence.86 Despite the increase in corporate groups and their types,
the statutory framework remained limited. Only two or three statutes explicitly regulated corporations in 1612.87
Both the volume of legal analysis and development of common law
rules to regulate corporations expanded during the later 1500s. These shifts
were likely in response to the proliferation of incorporations and to address
disputes over their powers. Thus, for example, accounts of corporations in
early sixteenth century lawbooks were parsimonious and merely entries
abridged from the Year Books with little or no analysis. Anthony Fitzherbert’s La Graunde Abridgement (1516), one of the period’s most important
printed reference works, did not have a separate section for corporations

83. J.H. Baker, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: 14831558, 622 (2003); see
Seipp, supra note 48, at 40.
84. SPELMAN, supra note 50, at 154.
85. BAKER, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, supra note 83, at 622; Reynolds, supra
note 48, at 12–13; BRITISH BOROUGH CHARTERS 1307–1660, supra note 26, at xxvi.
86. WITHINGTON, supra note 61, at 18.
87. 19 Hen. 7, cap. 7; 39 Eliz. 1 cap. 5 and the statute of artificers was usually considered to
regulate corporate activities, 5 Eliz. 1 c. 4.
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until Sir Robert Brooke produced his revision (1573).88 Similarly John
Rastell’s dictionary of law terms (1523) omitted to define a corporation,
whereas a later edition (1579) included a specific entry on corporations.89
By Sutton’s Hospital common law treatises had schematized the variety of
corporate forms that had once exasperated their predecessors. Corporations were either lay or temporal, and depending on the number of members, either sole or aggregate.90 Coke himself approved this classification
in his Institutes (1628).91 Three decades later, William Sheppard (1659)
finally wrote a sustained analysis of the corporate entity that summarized
the legal developments of the preceding century. Sheppard was even then
able to muse that “no mans pen amongst us, has bin employ’d on this subject before . . . .”92
Sheppard’s assertion was partly true: while Elizabethan and early
Stuart lawyers debated corporate powers and capacities at length, they
faced an absence of detailed analysis in the common law literature. Instead
judges and lawyers depended on passing statements and dicta in the Year
Books, which they mined to support different ontologies of the corporation
with roots in medieval canon law. On one account, the corporation was a
“body politic” composed of a head and a body. This idea traced back to
medieval writers such as John of Salisbury, who in the twelfth century
likened the commonwealth to the human body.93 Other medieval writers,
including Thomas Aquinas, applied the anthropological metaphor of the
corpus mysticum to the Catholic Church, in which Christ was the head of
the body of believers.94 The Church itself was thus conceptualized as a
corporate structure. The famous bull of Boniface VIII, Unam sanctam
(1302), expressed this idea in juristic form by adapting the structure to the
claim that the pope was the head of the body of the Church as the representative of Christ.95 Later jurists used this concept to represent the authority of temporal princes as heads of the body of their realms, and so the
fifteenth century English judge, Sir John Fortescue could write that a

88. ANTHONY FITZHERBERT, LA GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT, “Tabula” (1516); ROBERT BROOKE,
LA GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT 188–193 (1573).
89. JOHN RASTELL, AN EXPOSITION OF CERTAINE DIFFICULT AND OBSCURE WORDS (1523);
JOHN RASTELL, AN EXPOSITION OF CERTAINE DIFFICULT AND OBSCURE WORDS 52–3 (1579).
90. RASTELL, supra note 89, at 52b–53a.
91. EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2a, 250a
(1985).
92. WILLIAM SHEPPARD, OF CORPORATIONS, FRATERNITIES, AND GUILDS sig. A3 (1659). The
term “corporate” appears by 1408. Seipp, supra note 48, at 40.
93. KANTOROWICZ, supra note 24, at 199–200.
94. Id. at 200–02.
95. Id. at 194.
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kingdom “exists as a body mystical, governed by one man as head.”96
Other English judges such as John Prisot, chief justice of the Common
Pleas, generalized the corporate anthropomorphism when he explained in
1460 in a case over an annuity involving a dean and chapter that, “I have
not heard of such corporation to incorporate a body without a head.”97 Sir
John Fyneux’s statement in Hecker’s Case (1522) while he was chief justice of the King’s Bench, was the most authoritative among later lawyers:
“A corporation is a combination of head and body, and not only a head or
only a body. And it must be consonant with reason or else it does not
avail.”98 In Willion v. Berkley (1562) Serjeant John Southcote had similarly described the king’s body politic: “he and his subjects together compose the corporation . . . he is incorporated with them, and they with him,
and he is the head, and they are the members, and he has the sole government of them.”99
Yet there was also support for a more fictional view of the corporation as a mere artifice of law rather than a composite of individuals. The
sense of the corporation as a persona ficta is usually traced to Innocent IV
(1243-1254) and subsequent canon lawyers.100 The English Year Books
likewise contained passing evidence for fictional ideas about corporations,
such as a statement by Serjeant Richard Pygot in the Abbot of St. Hulme
(1481-1483) that “a corporation was only a name and could not be seen
and did not have substance.”101 Lawyers in Sutton’s Hospital relied on
both Fyneux and Pygot.
One of the notable characteristics of the early legal literature, as David Seipp suggested for the earlier medieval discussions, was that lawyers
held both views of the corporation. Rastell’s Expositions relied on Fyneux:
A corporation is a permanent thing that may have succession: And is
an assembly and joining together of many into one fellowshipp,
brotherhoode and minde, whereof one is hedde and cheefe, for the
rest are the body and this hedde and body knitte together make the
corporation.102
96. JOHN FORTESCUE, ON THE LAWS AND GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND 20 (Shelley Lockwood
ed., 1997); see KANTOROWICZ, supra note 24, at 218, 228; see also MARTIN LOUGHLIN,
FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 42–45 (2010); see also Howell Lloyd, Constitutionalism, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1450–1700, 262–63 (J. H. Burns & Mark Goldie eds.,
1991).
97. Y.B. 39 H. 6. 13b. Trans. David Seipp; see Seipp, supra note 48.
98. Cambridge U. Libr. MS Hh.ii.2, ff. 102r-v; YEAR BOOKS OF HENRY VIII: 12 - 14 HENRY
VIII 101–02 (John Baker ed., 2002).
99. Willion v. Berkley, 1 Plowden 234, 75 ER 355-6 (K.B. 1562).
100. Recent scholars have rejected the claim that Innocent IV articulated a modern fiction theory.
See Canning, supra note 24, at 15–17; see also Rodriguez, supra note 24, at 316–18.
101. Mich. 21 Edw. 4, pl. 4, fol. 12b–15a; see Seipp, supra note 48.
102. RASTELL, supra note 89, at 52a–b.
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John Cowell, a civilian, in his dictionary of terms of the law written
in 1607, observed that a corporation was a body politic with a “head officer, one or more, and members able by their common consent, to graunt
or to receive in law any thing within the compass of their charter . . .”103
Coke in his Institutes likened a corporation to a “body incorporate, because
the persons are made into a body, and are of capacity to take and grant,
etc.”104 However, the earliest dedicated treatment of corporations in the
common law literature, which was written under Elizabeth I, preferred Pygot’s abstraction that a corporation was a “body without a sowle that never
dyethe.”105 Similarly, Coke in Sutton’s Hospital described a corporation
as “ . . . invisible, immortal, and rests only in intendment and consideration of the law . . . .”106
The treatise literature over the next decades sometimes ascribed a
fictional definition to the corporation in general, while describing the essence of aggregate corporations as the real persons who made up the head
and body. Henry Finch’s posthumous Law (1627) explained that a corporation was “a bodie in fiction of Law, that indureth in perpetual succession.”107 In the same treatise he also drew upon Fyneux’s definition of the
corporation when he described corporations aggregate as, “of many persons, that is to say, of a head and body . . . .”108 When Sheppard published
Of Corporations, Fraternities, and Guilds (1659), he explained that the
corporation was a “ . . . Body, in fiction of Law; or, a Body Politick that
indureth in perpetuall succession.”109 He went on to describe how a lay
corporation aggregate was, “An Assembly or Cominalty, of many men,
gathered or joined together in a City, Town, or Burrough, into one fellowship[.]”110 Even Coke in an early case on the naming of a corporation,
Marriot v. Pascal, argued that a corporation aggregate could not be a pure
fiction, but needed a place certain “of their abiding, or otherwise it cannot
be discerned by the law, and it is but a mathematical thing, and nothing
else but a fiction, and they cannot be otherwise considered in law, but as
they are . . . within the bounds of their house.”111

103. JOHN COWELL, THE INTERPRETER sig. T2 (1607).
104. COKE, supra note 91, at 250a.
105. Oxford U. Bodleian Libr., MS Rawlinson B 410, f. 6v; the medieval precedents for this
description are described in Seipp, supra note 48.
106. 10 Coke Rep. 32 b, 77 ER 973.
107. HENRY FINCH, LAW, OR, A DISCOURSE THEREOF IN FOURE BOOKES 87, 91–94 (1627).
108. Id. at 91.
109. SHEPPARD, supra note 92, at 1–2.
110. Id. at 4.
111. JAMES GRANT, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS IN GENERAL, AS
WELL AGGREGATE AS SOLE 565, citing Marriott v. Pascal, 1 Leonard 126, 74 ER 149 (1588); see
Yarmouth Borough, 2 Brownlow & Goldesborough Reps. 292, 123 ER 949 (1609).
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The predisposition to analyze corporations as groups of real persons
related to practical problems facing lawyers of the period, especially corporate power over people. Lawyers were less concerned about issues of
legal personality than corporate jurisdiction.112 Towards the end of the sixteenth century there was a surge of cases testing the extent and exercise of
corporate authority to govern trades and people. Lawyers routinely cited
many of these foundational cases well into the eighteenth century and beyond.113 These cases reveal the preoccupation among judges and lawyers
with thinking about corporations foremost as a body politic needing government and as an instrument of wider government beyond its body politic.
By exercising political power, corporations were more than fictional entities, but people involved in a form of government, an expectation that imposed upon them an obligation to promote a wider social interest.
Lawyers routinely stated that corporations were a form of government. As Sheppard noted, the corporation was a tool of human reason that
“consists in fitting Laws and Polities for our better Government, and the
best of Polities is that Invention whereby men have bin fram’d into Corporations, Guilds, or Fraternities . . . .”114 Similarly, in a case involving the
incorporated Joiners Company of London (1582), the lawyer William
Fleetwood explained that,
The king has here founded a corporation, and granted government
and power to make reasonable, wholesome and meet ordinances for
government . . . To make corporations – which are only a name,
shadow or imagination – and not to give them order and government,
and correction, is nothing but a vain thing. Therefore order, rule and
government belong as a necessary incident to incorporation . . . Take
away government, and they are left as a dead body and
shadow . . . .115

Coke observed he made the same connection between corporations
and government while he was attorney general in the case of Davenant v.
Hurdis (1599). He explained that corporations make by-laws since it was
not possible by the general law to provide government “for each particular
society” given the diversity among cities and geography.116 Thomas
112. For a similar claim about an earlier period, see Canning, supra note 24, at 18.
113. The best known were Davenant v. Hurdis, Moore 586, 580 (K.B. 1599); Bonham’s Case, 8
Coke Rep. 113b (1610); and The Case of the Ipswich Tailors, 11 Coke Rep. 53, Godbolt 252 (1614).
114. SHEPPARD, supra note 92, at sig. A3r-v. See also the statement by Humfrey Starkey sjt.
Y.B. Mich 18. Edw. 4, pl. 17, ff. 15b-16a and COKE, supra note 91, at 2a.
115. Attorney-General v. Joiners’ Company of London (1582), printed in J.H. BAKER, THE
REINVENTION OF MAGNA CARTA 1216–1616 473 (2017).
116. Davenant v. Hurdis, Moore 586, 580 (K.B. 1599); compare Coke’s comments in The
Portreeves of Gravesend (1612), acknowledging that “there is no question” of the by-law making
power of corporations. See also Harv. L. Sch. MS 114, f. 65v.
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Fleming, who was solicitor general in the same case and later chief baron
of the Exchequer, explained that trade corporations did not manage their
trades or members in isolation from broader governance. London’s size
made it difficult to administer, and so companies were needed for its government, “ . . . thus in such city it is convenient to have inferior rulers that
should be vigilant each in the performance of their duty . . . .”117 Francis
Moore added that by-laws were necessary because of the limitation of
making a general law “for apt government for each particular society.”
Moore continued,
. . . the same reason that appoints general reason to govern kingdoms
ought to allow particular laws for governing particular societies, for
it is admitted that discipline is requisite in both . . . for which princes
invented discipline by government in nations, societies, and private
families.118

Societies, like companies, needed to create by-laws for the government and control of “iniquities” that would arise from “any assembly of
people.”119 Through the application of their government, corporations benefitted society through regulation. It was admitted in the Case of the Weavers of Newbury (1617) that the corporation was “able to make by laws and
ordinances for the better ordering of their society for avoiding deceit in the
trade of weaving and for direction of their apprentices . . . .”120
The functioning of corporations as forms of government stimulated
significant litigation during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, especially over the limits of corporate powers and whether they favored private interests.121 Most cases resulted from challenges to the exercise of quasi-public regulation by corporations. Litigants often contested
the warrant for specific corporate powers, alleged the repugnancy of their
exercise, and raised public interest arguments. For example, although by
Coke’s time it was accepted that incorporation required a royal or parliamentary charter, many corporations claimed their privileges through prescription and the presumption of a fictional, lost charter.122 In 1598, the
Privy Council queried the judges whether boroughs might prescribe
117. Davenant v. Hurdis, Moore 586 (K.B. 1599); see also Brit. Libr. Additional MS 25203, f.
145r.
118. Davenant v. Hurdis, Moore 586; see also Brit. Libr. Additional MS 25206, f. 112v (K.B.
1599).
119. Id.
120. The Case of the Weavers of Newbury, Brit. Libr. Harley MS 5149, f. 15r (1617).
121. Attorney-General v. Joiners’ Company of London (1582), printed in BAKER, supra note
115, at 468–76. See Chamberlain of London Case, 3 Leonard 264, 74 ER 674 (1591); see also The
Case of Corporations, 4 Coke Rep. 78a, 76 ER 1052 (1598); see also The Portreeves of Gravesend,
Harv. L. Sch. MS 114 f. 65r (1612); see also Norris v. Staps, Hutton 5, 123 ER 1060 (1617).
122. HALLIDAY, supra note 2, at 32.
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against their charters. The judges opined that they could.123 Lawyers questioned the extent to which corporate powers based on prescription or custom might be exercised, even if they were supported by statute.124 Many
of these disputes arose over hotly contested corporate powers to imprison
or seize goods, and to restrict the vending of goods.125
Aggrieved litigants claimed that individuals or groups exercised corporate power for their private economic gain or sought to control commerce that, as the anonymous author of an Elizabethan treatise on corporations explained, “ought to bee free and common to all citizens of the
same commonwealth.”126 The commentator continued that rights
“ . . . ought not to bee taken from any members of the same state without
the apparent utility and profit of the whole Bodie of the Comon
wealthe.”127 Public interest justified corporate government of manual
trades, which were “verie needefull that order bee taken” to ensure that
tradesmen had the requisite skills.128
This distinction in corporate government between public and private
interest animated the period’s controversy over monopolies.129 Nicholas
Fuller, counsel for the defendant in The Case of Monopolies (1602) and
no friend to crown policies, contrasted patents held by individuals that restrained trade with government by incorporated trade societies. While the
former was a monopoly because it functioned for private advantage, the
latter provided public benefits by helping people follow the biblical injunction that “every man should live by labour.”130 There were, he added,
“several arts, manual occupations and trades whereby we may have the
mutual help one of another, and all governed in due order by the wardens
and governours of the same society and fellowship.”131 Though these
123. See The Case of Corporations, 4 Coke Rep. 78a, 76 ER 1053 (1598).
124. See, e.g., Weavers v. Browne, Brit. Libr. Additional MS 25203, f. 292r; Davenant v Hurdis,
Moore 576, 72 ER 769 (1599); Davenant v. Hurdis, Brit. Libr. Additional MS 25206, f. 216r; Davenant
v Hurdis BL Additional MS 25203, f. 93r; Bonham’s Case, 8 Coke Rep. 107a, 77 ER 638 (1610);
College of Physician’s Case, 2 Brownlow & Goldesborough 255, 123 ER 928 (1609).
125. Attorney-General v. Joiners’ Company of London (1582), printed in BAKER, supra note
115, at 468–76. Clark’s Case,5 Coke Rep. 64a, 77 ER 152 (1598); Waltham v. Austen,, Brit. Libr.
Additional MS 25203, f. 75r-77v (1599); Davenant v Hurdis, Moore 576, 72 ER 769 (1599); Franklin
v. Green,, 1 Bulstrode 12, 80 ER 717 (1609); The Case of the City of London,8 Coke Rep.121b, 77
ER 658 (1610); Ipswich Tailors Case,, 11 Coke Rep. 53a, 77 ER 1218 (1614); Bagg’s Case,11 Coke
Rep. 93b, 77 ER 1271 (1615), and a fuller report in Brit. Libr. Additional MS 25213, f. 176v; AttorneyGeneral v. Cusack and Citizens of Dublin,, Brit. Libr. Lansdowne MS 1077, f. 6r. (1617).
126. Brit. Libr. Lansdowne MS 811, f. 83r, 94v.
127. Brit. Libr. Lansdowne MS 811, f. 85r.
128. Brit. Libr. Lansdowne MS 811, f. 101r.
129. For the distinction between monopoly and legitimate restraint, see Nachbar, supra note 36,
at 1339–40; ANDREA FINKELSTEIN, HARMONY AND THE BALANCE: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH ECONOMIC THOUGHT 67 (2000).
130. Darcy v. Allin, Noy 179, 74 ER 1131, 1137 (1602).
131. Darcy v. Allin, Noy 180, 74 ER 1131, 1137 (1602).
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corporations regulated trades and limited access to employment they were
not monopolies. Their members sold on their own account and corporate
organization provided “settled governments, and wardens and governours
to keep them in order…”132 In the Case of the Tailors of Ipswich (1614),
the judges explained the distinction that a corporation “may make ordinances for the ordering and government of any trade; but thereby they cannot make a monopoly for that is to take away free-trade, which is the birthright of every subject.”133
Finally, these debates over corporate powers led to more subtle wrangling over appropriate forms of corporate government for different trades
in different places.134 Economic writers of the period assumed that trade
needed to be “governed” or regulated in the public interest. The most
prominent among them, Thomas Mun, Edward Misselden and Gerard
Malynes, all believed in the necessity of governed trades even as they disagreed about much else. Misselden observed that, “The trades of this Kingdome which by his Majesty . . . are reduced under Order and [Government] into Corporations, Companies, and Societies, [do] [certainly] much
[Advance] and [Advantage] the Commerce of this Common-wealth…”135
Malynes, supposedly a “free trader,” objected to those who “would ha[v]e
all things at large in the course of Traffique, and that there should be no
societies or corporations of Merchants for any places of Trade…”136 The
disagreement among these early political economists was over how commerce to a region or within a region ought to be governed: how traders
might be licensed, how infrastructure for the trade would be built and
maintained, and even the diplomatic relations with the rulers of overseas
markets might suggest the need for specifically corporate government.137
Debate continued over the exact form of corporate organization needed to
govern particular trades or markets.138
132. Darcy v. Allin, Noy 183, 74 ER 1131, 1139 (1602).
133. The Clothworkers of Ipswich, Godbolt 253, 78 ER 147, 148 (1614); The Case of the Tailors
of Ipswich, 11 Coke Rep. 54a, 77 ER 1220 (1614).
134. Carlos Eduardo Suprinyak, Dreams of Order and Freedom: Debating Trade Management
in Early Seventeenth-Century England, 40 J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 401, 418 (2018).
135. EDWARD MISSELDEN, FREE TRADE. OR, THE MEANES TO MAKE TRADE FLORISH WHEREIN
THE CAUSES OF THE DECAY OF TRADE IN THIS KINGDOME, ARE DISCOUERED: AND THE REMEDIES
ALSO TO REMOOUE THE SAME, ARE REPRESENTED 53–54 (1622).
136. GERARD MALYNES, THE MAINTENANCE OF FREE TRADE ACCORDING TO THE THREE
ESSENTIALL PARTS OF TRAFFIQUE 67–68 (1622).
137. The need for the government of markets by corporations was surprisingly durable. Even
Adam Smith, who opposed corporate monopolies, could admit corporate government for some particular trades such as commerce with the Hudson’s Bay region. 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 744 (V.i.e. 21) (1982).
138. William A. Pettigrew & Tristan Stein, The Public Rivalry Between Regulated and Joint
Stock Corporations and the Development of Seventeenth-Century Corporate Constitutions: Public Rivalry Between Regulated and Joint Stock Corporations, 90 HIST. RES. 341–62 (2017).
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These disputes stimulated the development of a jurisprudence to regulate corporate government. The common law judges explicitly required
that by-laws or their exercise must be consonant with reason and with the
existing common law. There could not be a “repugnancy,” a restriction
that was written into corporate charters. As Sir John Popham, chief justice
of the King’s Bench, explained in Payne v. Haughton when discussing the
validity of a by-law: “I hold that these ordinances to be against the common law . . . against reason . . . .” he wrote, since they would enable the
mayor to establish monopolies even of “all arts and sciences in the city
which is against the public good and against reason.”139 It was similarly
declared in Norris v. Staps (1617) that “as reason is given to the natural
body for the governing of it, so the body corporate must have laws as a
politick reason to govern it, but those laws must ever be subject to the
general law of the realm as subordinate to it.”140 These disputes over corporate government and the jurisprudence that emerged from them had farreaching implications. Mary Sarah Bilder, for instance, has explored how
repugnancy was used as a means of controlling colonial governments,
many of which were incorporated and included repugnancy clauses in their
charters.141
Far from a period of settled law, the legal debate over corporations,
jurisdiction, and government during the decades on either side of Sutton’s
Hospital lay behind significant constitutional developments. When litigants contested corporate powers to imprison or to seize goods during the
late Elizabethan period, they increasingly made these claims based on
“fundamental rights” enshrined in statutes such as Magna Carta and the
writ of habeas corpus.142
The significance of this history is twofold. First, lawyers explicitly
connected corporate government with the public good. The “public purpose” of the corporation arose not because incorporation was a concession
of the state, but rather because a corporation was a form of government
that reproduced order within society for public benefit. Second, the liveliness of the debates over corporate powers made clear the importance of
government to the existence of a corporation aggregate. This was the key
issue in Sutton’s Hospital.

139. Payne v. Haughton, Brit. Lib. Additional 25203, f. 203r.
140. Norris v. Staps, 80 Eng. Rep. 357, 358 (C.P. 1616).
141. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502, 566
(2006).
142. BAKER, supra note 115, at 311–22; see SMITH, supra note 65; PAUL HALLIDAY, HABEAS
CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 146–52 (2010).

2021]

Beginning of History for Corporate Law

391

THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND TO THE “INCOMPREHENSIBLE”
CASE OF SUTTON’S HOSPITAL
Sutton’s Hospital was both a high-stakes legal drama in its time, as
well as one of the most important discussions of corporate ideas during the
period. The donation of Thomas Sutton (1532–1611), among the wealthiest commoners of the early Stuart period, transformed a disreputable
money lender into a Protestant hero, “the right Phoenix of Charity in our
times.”143 Protestant contemporaries applauded Sutton’s donation of the
majority of his estate to found an almshouse and school in the London
Charterhouse (formerly a Carthusian priory) as a magnanimous example
of piety. The gift made “Gods poore Saints . . . the Heyres of all tho[s]e
great riches.”144 Professional letter writers reported on the news from London and even minor provincial clergymen took notice.145
The beginnings of the story are found in Sutton’s climb from obscurity to great wealth. He rose first in the service of the earls of Warwick and
Leicester who noticed his abilities as a prudent administrator.146 Backed
by Warwick’s favor, he was appointed Master of the Ordnance in the
North and then distinguished himself in that position during the suppression of the 1569 Northern Rising.147 Through service and patronage, he
secured leases of ecclesiastical lands, which he diligently improved in
keeping with the most advanced estate management practices of the
time.148 It was not in land, however, where he made his vast wealth. Although erroneously remembered as a “great merchant,” Sutton was a successful moneylender for which he was the target of contemporary criticism
and possibly also the satire of Ben Johnson in his portrayal of the crafty

143. JOHN STOW, THE SURVEY OF LONDON 478 (1633).
144. THOMAS SUTTON, THE CHARTERHOUSE WITH THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF
THOMAS SUTTON ESQUIRE 6 (1614); PERCIVAL BURRELL, SUTTON’S SYNAGOGUE OR, THE ENGLISH
CENTURION 3 (1629); see generally STEPHEN PORTER, THE LONDON CHARTERHOUSE 10–11, 17–18
(2009).
145. For example, the entry of Thomas Wyatt, rector of the village of Ducklington, Oxford U.
Bodleian Libr. MS Top Oxon. c. 378, p. 225; see generally JOHN CHAMBERLAIN, THE LETTERS OF
JOHN CHAMBERLAIN 1, 323–24 (Norman McClure ed., 1939).
146. Biographical information is drawn from Hugh Trevor-Roper, Sutton, Thomas (1532–1611),
in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/26806 (last visited Apr 26, 2021); see also Neal R. Shipley, Thomas Sutton: Tudor-Stuart Moneylender, 50 BUS.
HIST. REV. 456–76 (1976).
147. Shipley, supra note 146, at 458.
148. Paul Warde, The Idea of Improvement, c.1520–1700, in CUSTOM, IMPROVEMENT AND THE
LANDSCAPE IN EARLY MODERN BRITAIN 127–48, 127–32 (Richard Hoyle ed., 2011); See Richard W.
Hoyle, Estate Management, Tenurial Change and Capitalist Farming in Sixteenth-Century England,
in IL MERCATO DELLA TERRA, SECC. XIII-XVIII: ATTI DELLA TRENTACINQUESIMA SETTIMANA DI
STUDI, 5–9 MAGGIO 2003 353–82 (Simonetta Cavaciocchi ed., 2004).
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but greedy figure of Volpone.149 Sutton was more than the average usurer,
however, and while his ledgers have been lost, his surviving papers
demonstrate the range of his friendships and associations with powerful
individuals in Stuart England. He loaned money to Thomas Cecil, Lord
Burghley, the brother of James VI and I’s chief minister, and his stepdaughter married the son of Sir John Popham, the future chief justice of
the King’s Bench, in 1590.150 His relationships with leading lawyers and
judges were important to a man whose business was morally suspect in the
culture of the period.151 They proved especially useful when Sutton decided to erect his hospital and named several leading judges, including
Coke, as governors.
Sutton’s foundation of the Charterhouse was a long-standing ambition for a man who had no legitimate children.152 He established a trust
and assigned his lands for a hospital in Hallingbury, Essex as early as
1594, naming Popham and Thomas Egerton, the future lord chancellor, as
trustees.153 Yet, Sutton, for unknown reasons, did not commence construction at Hallingbury and waited to establish his project on a firmer legal
basis by securing a statute incorporating the hospital there in the February
of 1610.154 The delay gave occasion for friends and associates to warn him
of the urgent need to settle his arrangements. Anne Laurence wrote to urge
Sutton on to charitable works, “your gray hairs are messengers sent to bid
you prepare your body for the grave and your soul for God.”155 Subsequent
events proved the wisdom of this advice, because Sutton’s untimely death
meant that it was possible to challenge the legal foundation of his hospital.
Sutton seems to have been seeking a bolder stroke by placing his
hospital closer to London. He found his opportunity through the purchase
of the Charterhouse from Thomas Howard, Earl of Suffolk. Suffolk, who
likely played a hidden but important role in the subsequent litigation, was
one of the most grasping individuals in a period well-known for official

149. Robert Evans, Thomas Sutton: Ben Jonson’s Volpone?, 68 PHILO. Q. 295, 301–02 (1989);
Shipley, supra note 146, at 461–62.
150. Thomas Burghley to Sutton, London Metro. Archive, ACC/1876/F/03/001 (23 December
1602); Sutton married the heiress, Elizabeth Dudley.
151. For example, see his agent’s intervention with Lord Egerton, John Harrington to Sutton,
London Metro. Archive ACC/1876/F/03/5/2/23 (Sept. 7, 1607).
152. His only son was illegitimate and not mentioned in Sutton’s will (he pursued a military
career). See Trevor-Roper, supra note 146.
153. PHILIP BEARCROFT, AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THOMAS SUTTON ESQ; AND OF HIS
FOUNDATION IN CHARTER-HOUSE 13 (1737).
154. See HOUSE OF COMMONS OF GREAT BRITAIN, THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 1155 (Dawsons of Pall Mall, vol. 4, pt. 1, 1963) (1819).
155. Anne Lawrence to Sutton, London Metro. Archives ACC/1876/F/03/5/3 (June 1610); see
also John Lawe to Sutton, London Metro. Archives ACC/1876/F3/05/2/27 (Mar. 21, 1610).
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corruption.156 He reached the apogee of his power in 1614 when he was
appointed Lord Treasurer, only to fall in 1618 in a sensational trial for
abuse of office, bribe-taking, and extortion.157 Suffolk’s extravagance
fueled his greed and in 1610 he was constructing Audley End, one of the
great Jacobean manor houses.158 In need of funds and interested in lands
adjoining Audley End owned by Sutton, Suffolk offered the sale of the
Charterhouse. Seizing his chance, Sutton became an “earnest suit[or]” to
the earl and bargained to purchase the Charterhouse for £13,000 on 9 May
1611.159 Renovations and the eviction of tenants caused further delays.160
In order to give the hospital in the Charterhouse a legal foundation,
Sutton petitioned for letters patent of incorporation from the king, which
passed the great seal on June 22, 1611.161 The governors named in the letters patent were a parade of seventeenth-century political luminaries, and
included the archbishop of Canterbury; the lord chancellor (Egerton); the
earl of Salisbury (the kings leading minister); two judges (Coke and Sir
Thomas Foster); and the attorney general.162 Already aged and becoming
ill in October, Sutton moved to complete his arrangements, nominating a
master on October 30 and, by bargain and sale on November 1, transferred
his property to the governors of the hospital for the sum of £5.163 Although
at the time of Sutton’s death, on December 12, 1611, he had appointed
governors of the hospital and named a master, the hospital did not receive
students or residents until October 3, 1614.164 Through his will, Sutton
gave a large number of other charitable bequests, but the residue of his
estate, some £50,000 was given to the hospital with £1,000 set aside for
the legal defenses that were expected.165 The money was needed; delay
was nearly the hospital’s undoing. The shifting of the hospital to the Charterhouse, the wording of the charter, and the founder’s death before the
hospital was in operation all gave determined heirs openings to attempt to
defeat the settlement of Sutton’s lands on the charity.
156. LINDA LEVY PECK, COURT PATRONAGE AND CORRUPTION IN EARLY STUART ENGLAND
156–57 (1990).
157. Andrew Thrush, The Fall of Thomas Howard, 1st Earl of Suffolk and the Revival of Impeachment in the Parliament of 1621, 37 PARLIAM. HIST. 200–09 (2018).
158. Id. at 202–03.
159. STOW, supra note 143, at 479.
160. To the Worshipful My Very Good Friend, London Metro. Archives ACC/1876/F/03/5/2.
161. To the Worshipful Mr. Sutton, London Metro. Archives ACC/1876/F/03/5/2/50.
162. The other governors were the bishops of London and Rochester; the deans of St. Paul’s and
Westminster; a master in Chancery; the two executors (John Lawe and Richard Sutton); two gentlemen; and the master of the hospital. Brit. Libr. MS Additional 12496, f. 306r. The governors were also
active in defending the hospital, see The Governor’s Letters to the Executors, London Metro. Archives
ACC/1876/L/02/8a.
163. The Case of Sutton’s Hospital, 10 Coke Rep. 16a–18b, ER 95355.
164. STOW, supra note 143, at 481.
165. SUTTON, supra note 144.
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LITIGATION IN SUTTON’S HOSPITAL
Although litigation continued into the 1620s over the estate, it was
Sutton’s closest heir-at-law, Simon Baxter, who risked his legacy of £300
by challenging the validity of the incorporation and the endowment of the
hospital. Though sometimes described as a “cousin,” a word with a looser
meaning at the time, Baxter was Sutton’s nephew by his sister.166 Baxter’s
audacious challenge to the charity, which had £1000 to defend itself and
some of the most powerful and legally adept people in England as governors, is puzzling. He was unlettered and the legal expense of contesting
Sutton’s will was tremendous.167
The riskiness and expense of the lawsuit may explain why Baxter’s
initial legal strategy was to take the Charterhouse into his possession
quickly and seek a summary decision. Baxter retained two leading barristers (and future judges), Humphrey Davenport and Henry Yelverton, to
begin litigation in the Court of Wards. The early modern English legal
system was highly pluralist with many overlapping jurisdictions, each potentially competing with the others for litigants. The choice of venue was,
therefore, revealing. Wards heard cases that touched on the king’s revenue
as lord paramount and protected his feudal rights over tenancies-inchief.168 These incidents included wardship and livery of seisin. Upon the
death of a tenant-in-chief, an inquisition post-mortem occurred to discover
whether the king had any rights to wardship or entry fines. Baxter, who
was not underaged, sought to take advantage of proceedings in Wards to
strengthen his right to Sutton’s estate. Baxter likely claimed that the governors were obstructing him from possession, and he was consequently
unable to take livery and seisin, and pay the entry fine. Given James VI
and I’s well-known need for money and later direct appeals to him by Baxter’s advocates, the offering of the fine may have been intended to attract
the interest and even intervention of the king in thwarting Sutton’s settlement.
By January of 1612, the court was ordering all documentary evidence
brought in for consideration.169 Near the end of February, Baxter and a
large group went to the Charterhouse to seize possession. Richard Birde,
the porter, barred the gates and prevented their entry. Baxter and his men
then threatened Birde that “unless he would deliver the keyes of the said
166. A Copy of the Verdict, London Metro. Archives ACC/1876/L/02/42/7.
167. He signed with a mark, see Symon Baxters Petition, London Metro. Archives
ACC/1876/L/02/60; and was described as a tanner, see Secretaries of State: State Papers Domestic,
James I, Nat’l Archives vol. 68, no. 18.
168. 6 BAKER, supra note 80, at 229–31; H. E. BELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY AND
RECORDS OF THE COURT OF WARDS & LIVERIES 75–80, 103–08 (1953).
169. William Atkinson to Butler, London Metro. Archives ACC/1876/L/02/01.
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house . . . he should stay no longer there but be cast into the Fleete.”170 The
porter refused, and a smith was summoned to break the locks of the gates.
Yet by the time Baxter and his accomplices entered, Birde had already
barricaded the lodge and rooms in the main house. For the next year, the
Charterhouse was divided between the two hostile camps and began to fall
into “great decay” as Baxter and his men allegedly carried away fountains,
cisterns, and even five apricot trees.171 Around the same time, Baxter’s
solicitor Israel Fryer entered into various manors and lands given to the
hospital.172
Baxter petitioned the king and the Privy Council for a summary hearing while the governors of the hospital sought to refer the dispute to the
common law.173 The king was not, however, willing to intervene directly,
and the Privy Council directed the parties to arbitration to avoid “the longe
circuite of lawe.” The Council appointed the Chief Justice of the King’s
Bench, Thomas Fleming, Chief Baron Lawrence Tanfield, and Henry Hobart and Francis Bacon, the attorneys and solicitors general, to hear the
matter.174 The choice of Hobart and Bacon involved protagonists for each
side among the arbitrators: Hobart was a governor of the hospital and Bacon would later be counsel to Baxter. After many delays caused by the
inability or unwillingness of Baxter’s counsel to attend, the arbitrators
heard arguments in May 1612, but refused to provide a determination in
June because they believed the issue should ultimately be resolved at
law.175 Around this time, Bacon wrote to James I attempting to persuade
him to intervene in the case and remodel the charity, calling it a “ rude
mass and chaos of a good deed.”176 Turning the virtue of Sutton’s immense
gift of property into a vice, Bacon likened it to the donations given by
Catholic benefactors, presumably to monasteries, that began in “ostentation… to end in corruption and abuse.”177 Instead, Bacon suggested the
donation be redirected to colleges and to improve church livings.178

170. Witnesses of the Hospital, London Metro. Archives ACC/1876/L/02/58. The Fleet River is
near to the Charterhouse.
171. A Copy of the Last Order in Chancery, London Metro. Archives ACC/1876/L/02/47; A
Copy of the Petition ex Hospital to the King, London Metro. Archives ACC/1876/L/02/7; A Breviate
for the possession of the Charterhouse, London Metro. Archives ACC/1876/L/02/46B.
172. Baxter, London Metro. Archives ACC/1876/L/02/9.
173. A Copy of the Petition ex Hospital to the King, London Metro. Archives ACC/1876/L/02/7.
174. Baxter, supra note 173.
175. The Right Honourable our verye good lords, London Metro. Archives
ACC/1876/L/02/13A; the Privy Council’s direction on 16 June 1612, London Metro. Archives
ACC/1876/L/02/13B.
176. 4 FRANCIS BACON, LETTERS AND LIFE 250 (James Spedding ed., 1868).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 254.
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Bacon’s approach to the king suggests that those who sought to unpick the
donation were keen to avoid scrutiny at law.
It also seems likely that Baxter was backed by other interests, which
explains his willingness to hazard such a difficult legal challenge. Baxter
himself, after the defeat of his case, wrote to the governors to explain that
he was “seduced by wicked councell and being an unlearned man was contented (to his now great grief) to yield his consent...”179 Baxter partly
blamed the lawyers who convinced him of the possibility of prevailing at
law though he had, of course, done a great deal more in the proceedings
than offering his name. The lawyers now wanted their money and Baxter
noted that he spent a “great part of his estate and is likely to pay great sums
of money for [sic] his Seducers in a manner to his undoing.”180 Yet the
records of the hospital also suggest there were other players involved who
perhaps gave Baxter the confidence to attack a well-defended settlement.
Israel Fryer is laconically described in these manuscripts as “my Lord
Chamberlyns man.”181 Suffolk was the lord chamberlain at the time and,
having sold the Charterhouse to him, was well-aware of Sutton’s activities.
With the case referred to the common law courts, litigation commenced in the court of Chancery in the fall of 1612.182 The hospital could
not defend itself without the evidence detained in the court of Wards.183 A
request to the Privy Council was needed to recover the documentation,
which Baxter claimed belonged to him as title to the Charterhouse.184 The
governors also sought an injunction for payment from tenants who, with a
little convincing from Baxter, were refusing to pay rents and wasting the
lands.185 The division among the crown’s law officers was now open, with
Bacon serving as counsel for Baxter and Hobart for the hospital. The
Chancery ordered the case to be tried at the common law by trespass and
once a verdict was found, the case was referred to the Exchequer Chamber
before all the judges of England. Importantly, the Chancery, where Egerton was judge, placed its thumb on the scales in favor of the hospital, enjoining that if judgement passed for the governors in the Exchequer

179. Simon Baxter’s Petition, London Metro. Archives ACC/1876/L/02/60.
180. Id.
181. A Copy of the Petition to the Lord Grace of Canterbury, London Metro. Archives
ACC/1876/L/02/8; see also State Papers Domestic, supra note 167 (“wants not abettors.”).
182. A Copy of the Late Order in Chancery, London Metro. Archives ACC/1876/L/02/47.
183. A Breviate for a Motion in the Court of Wards, London Metro. Archives
ACC/1876/L/02/16.
184. A Petition of the Hospital, London Metro. Archives ACC/1876/L/02/06; London Metro.
Archives ACC/1876/L/02/18, 19.
185. To Our Loving Friend, London Metro. Archives ACC/1876/L/02/17; Mr Sutton’s Hospital
in Chancery, London Metro. Archives ACC/1876/L/02/59; see also Poynts to Be Advised, London
Metro. Archives ACC/1876/L/02/18.
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Chamber the matter was settled, but if for Baxter, then “the equitye of the
cause was still retayned in this Court.”186
The common law case was brought on an action of trespass in the
King’s Bench in November 1612 by Baxter against the two executors of
Sutton’s will, Richard Sutton and John Lawe.187 Once the jury delivered
its verdict of fact, the case was adjourned for special judgment into the
Exchequer Chamber where it was heard by all the common law judges of
England over four days in May 1613. Both sides retained highly skilled
counsel, with John Walter and Henry Yelverton joining Bacon to argue for
Baxter.
ARGUMENTS IN THE CASE OF SUTTON’S HOSPITAL
Only Coke printed his report of the case and his hostility to the plaintiff’s argument is evident from the text. Baxter’s suit was an assault on an
“honourable work of charity,” his arguments, according to Coke, were
“hatched out of mere conceit and new invention” and “not worthy to be
moved at the Bar, nor remembered at the Bench.”188 In keeping with this
assessment, Coke provided only the briefest description of their content in
his report.189 Nor did he report on the opinions of the individual judges in
the case, two of whom sided with the plaintiffs. Coke’s partisanship is evident in other ways: he was advising the governors during the early equity
court proceedings and had been a debtor to Sutton.190
The manuscript reports of the case balance Coke’s account. The
notes of the counsel and their early discussion of the case make clear that
the major question was whether the governors were incorporated as a body
politic on the death of Sutton or “[w]hether there was an hospital fownded
at or in the Charterhowse by the said Letters Patent,… without anie further
Acte to be donne by Thomas Sutton afterwards . . . .”191 The defendant’s
position was that the King had nominated and appointed governors, “and
made them a bodye politique and gave them license and capacity to take
of the said Thomas Sutton.”192 The opinion that the governors solicited in
1612 from leading lawyers, including Robert Houghton, Richard Hutton,
and Francis Moore, likewise concluded “that those sixteene governors for
the time being shalbe incorporated and have a perpetuall succession forever in deede, fact and name and shalbe one bodie corporate and
186. Mr Sutton’s Hospital in Chancery, supra note 185.
187. Mich. 10 Jac. Rot 574; for dating of the Exchequer Chamber, see Brit. Libr. Hargrave 15,
f. 50r.
188. The Case of Sutton’s Hospital, 10 Coke Rep. 24a, 29a, ER 962, 968.
189. The Case of Sutton’s Hospital, 10 Coke Rep. 23b24b ER 96162.
190. A Note of Diverse Statutes, London Metro. Archives ACC/1876/F3/05/11.
191. Objections Against the Hospital, London Metro. Archives ACC/1876/L/02/10c.
192. A Copy of the Petition ex Hospital to the King, London Metro. Archives ACC/1876/L/02/7.
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politique.”193 Though Sutton had not actually erected a physical hospital,
he nominated a master and thus the foundation was valid.194 Similarly, the
author of the incomplete manuscript report of the case came away believing that the question largely turned on whether the Charterhouse was
merely a hospital in intention and therefore insufficient, or whether the
incorporation had some real existence despite there being no actual hospital “but I did not continue to the end etc.”195 This was the crux of the case.
Were Sutton and the King’s acts sufficient to incorporate a body politic?
The fuller manuscript reports detailed the three major arguments that
Baxter’s counsel made, to prove that the governors were not a corporation
at the time of Sutton’s death. First, they claimed that the legal foundation
of the Charterhouse was somehow deficient. The Act of Parliament had
established a hospital at Hallingbury and the lands had been granted to that
incorporation; therefore, the King could not grant Sutton’s lands to the
Charterhouse and the letters patent were of no force. Moreover, the letters
patent had established the hospital in the present, but Sutton did not nominate a master until October 30th. The description in the letters patent of
the location of the corporation was also too vague and therefore there was
no place certain. In fact, until Sutton had built his hospital, “there is not
any certainty of the place, and by consequence no corporation.”196
Second, Baxter argued that Sutton had not founded an “actual” or
“mechanical” hospital prior to his death. Even if the letters patent were
valid, Sutton did not perform the terms of the license granted by the charter, which had referred to a present incorporation. In fact, the present incorporation suggested that Sutton should have founded a hospital and
nominated a master prior to the patent. Even by his death the corporation
was incomplete: Baxter’s counsel argued that there could be no governors
or a master without an actual hospital with poor in it. At best, this was only
a theoretical or “mathematical” hospital, and therefore did not fulfill the
license by the time of Sutton’s death. This was the most debated point.
Third, the bargain and sale of the lands to the governors was also void.
Since no hospital had been founded, the sale was ineffective. The consideration of five pounds had been paid for by private persons, but not in any
politic capacity.
Bacon and Walter argued that a corporation needed to have a distinct
reality and could not simply be a fiction of law. As Walter explained:
“there was no hospital, because it was not well incorporated . . . [only] one
193. Copy of the Case Touching the Hospitall, London Metro. Archives ACC/1876/L/02/20B.
194. Id.
195. Brit. Libr. Additional MS 25213, f. 149r. All law French translations are my own unless
otherwise indicated.
196. Harv. L. Sch. MS 114, ff. 90v-91v.
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intended in reputation or expectancy . . . .”197 Baxter’s other lawyers rehearsed a similar line of reasoning: there was no valid incorporation because no working hospital was established when the letters patent were
granted or at the time of Sutton’s death. The Charterhouse, as Bacon
pointed out, was “not an actual hospital, but a hospital solely in intention
(for it remained in the will and pleasure of Sutton to make it or not . . . .”198
If the body of the corporation had not been made prior to the act, then
Sutton only had a license to found the hospital. But he had failed to fulfill
those conditions that would have perfected the corporation prior to his
death.
Walter explained that there were three conditions that were necessary
for a corporation to come into existence: persons living who make up the
body politic; the designation of a place certain; and a corporation house
(e.g., a working hospital).199 To prove that there was no body politic, Bacon, Walter, and Yelverton aimed at the governors. They began by acknowledging that the authority to grant incorporation was the King’s and
could be granted for either “purchase” or for “government.”200 The King,
however, could not simply do as he pleased in the making of corporations.
The King could not incorporate a town or a group that did not exist.201
Such acts would be unreasonable and, therefore, void. Moreover, there
were several things the King could not have done by the patent and that
instead Sutton had needed to accomplish to perfect the corporation. For
example, the King had no power to include Sutton’s lands within the incorporation, since by doing so, he would have injured the possession of
his subject. Sutton had to convey the lands and property himself. Yet to
convey the lands, there needed to be body politic capable of receiving
these lands. Baxter’s counsel argued that no such body politic existed at
the time of Sutton’s death, since the King could not make a corporation
for government without a head and body, or a place certain.202
The authority for Baxter’s lawyers was the statement by Fyneux in
Hecker’s Case (1522) that “[a] corporation is a combination of head and
body, and not only a head or only a body. And it must be consonant with

197. Brit Libr. Additional MS 25213, f. 149v; Harv. L. Sch. MS 114, f. 90v.
198. Harv. L. Sch. MS 114, f. 107r.
199. Cambridge U. Libr. MS Hh.ii.2, f. 102r; Harv. L. Sch. MS 114, f. 91v.
200. Cambridge U. Libr. MS Hh.ii.2, f. 104r; Harv. L. Sch. MS 114, f. 90v, relying on King’s
College Cambridge v. Hekker (1522), in J.H. BAKER, YEAR BOOKS OF HENRY VIII, 12-14 HENRY
VIII (1520-1523), 98-102 (Baker ed., London, 2002); Hecker’s Case, Y.B. Pasch. 13 Hen. VIII, pl. 2;
Mich. 14 Henry VIII, pl. 2; HENRY FINCH, LAW, OR A DISCOURSE THEREOF (London, 1627), STC
10871, 91.
201. Cambridge U. Libr. MS Hh.ii.2, f. 102r.
202. Cambridge U. Libr. MS Hh.ii.2, f. 102r-v (Walter); Harv. L. Sch. MS 114, 107r (Bacon).
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reason or else it does not avail.”203 Thus, Walter explained that “Fineux
defined a corporation that is aggregate as a body [and head], therefore this
is a thing requisite to found the hospital . . . .204 The Charterhouse had no
head in law for several reasons: the corporation was made without the
nomination of a master; and, even though one was later nominated, the
governors had no body to rule over since there was no body of residents at
the Charterhouse. How could there be a head without a body? The King
could not make a corporation for government without a head as this would
not be consonant with reason.205 A head needed something to rule over for
“governors and the thing to be governed were relative” and without “living
persons” to compose the body, the governors governed only “imaginary
things.”206 If there was no head, there was no corporate capacity, and if
there was no corporate capacity, no land could be transferred under the
license of the patent; therefore, no place certain.
Baxter’s lawyers were not reaching at straws; Fyneux’s dictum appeared in law treatises and dictionaries. As Bacon explained, corporations
were called bodies politic and “framed by the policy of the law, but to
frame a body politic where it is not of any use is of little policy . . . .207
From the King, Bacon noted, came all government and all corporations,
but the King could not make a corporation with governors who governed
no one. A governor was only a governor if they had people to govern over,
such as dean and chapter or mayor and communality.208 As Bacon noted,
“governors and the thing governed” were akin to relatives like father and
child.209
JUDICIAL REASONING IN THE CASE OF SUTTON’S HOSPITAL
Coke’s report largely describes the successful defense, which argued,
inter alia, that an incorporation needed to precede the licenses because, in
order to accomplish the foundation of the hospital, a capacity was needed
that allowed for succession. These arguments assumed a more practical
rather than theoretical cast, as Coke wrote, somewhat commonsensically,
there needed to be a corporate capacity in order for many early functions

203. Cambridge U. Libr. MS Hh.ii.2, ff. 102r-v; Harv. L. Sch. MS 114, f. 107v. For authority,
Baxter’s counsel cited Y.B. 22 Edw. 4, The Corporation of 9 Angels, and John Fyneux; see YEAR
BOOKS OF HENRY VIII, supra note 200, at 101.
204. Brit. Libr. Additional MS 25213, f. 149r; Cambridge U. Libr. MS Hh.ii.2, f. 102r-v.
205. Cambridge U. Libr. MS Hh.ii.2, f. 102r, relying on a statement by William de Thorpe, Chief
Justice of the King’s Bench in 1348.
206. Cambridge U. Libr. MS Hh.ii.2, f. 102r-v.
207. Harv. L. Sch. MS 114, f. 107v.
208. Cambridge U. Libr. MS Hh.ii.2, f. 102v.
209. Harv. L. Sch. MS 114, f. 107r.
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to be performed.210 The incorporation, as the defense argued, was preparatory to the subsequent government as Thomas Coventry explained, “and
if this hospital should be a hospital in reputation this is sufficient.”211
This claim that a corporation in reputation or expectancy was sufficient to provide a politic capacity relied on an interpretation of another line
of cases that was ultimately rooted in the idea of a persona ficta. Coke
explicitly rejected the interpretation of Fyneux and Prisot. He wrote that
their claim, that a corporation aggregate of many cannot be a body without
a head, was “utterly denied” and observed that most of the earliest corporations were “bodies without any head.”212 He argued instead that even if
an incorporation by letters patent created a corporation “in abstracto, but
not concreto, [un]til[] the naming of the master” that was sufficient to take
land.213
Even Coke, however, did not deny the importance of real people to
incorporation. He noted that in the present case there was already a “lawful
corporation of the governors . . . .”214 He also explained that “the essence
of the incorporation, are persons to be incorporated.”215 These comments
echoed those of the hospital’s counsel. Coventry had also observed that,
“It is not the place that makes them a corporation, but the persons,” and he
and the hospital’s other lawyers all argued for the legitimacy of the corporation’s governors as an incorporated body politic.216 To counter the claim
that the corporation could not have governors without governed, and therefore could not take the lands, the defendant’s counsel explained that the
King might appoint the general of an army without an army. You could
still have a head even while the body was in expectancy. If you had a head,
you had a body politic, and you could receive lands and perform other
corporate functions.
The judges might simply have accepted that the corporation existed
as a fiction even though the hospital and its body politic were still incomplete; however, they did not. They remained committed to the reality of
the body politic without which the corporation could not be said to have
come into existence. The majority of judges recognized that the hospital
was only in expectancy, but Sutton had nonetheless, before his death, composed the corporation of real people who had been nominated as the head
of the corporation.

210. The Case of Sutton’s Hospital, 10 Coke Rep. 26a–26b, ER 964-65.
211. Harv. L. Sch. MS 114, f. 92r.
212. The Case of Sutton’s Hospital, 10 Coke Rep. 30b, ER 970.
213. The Case of Sutton’s Hospital, 10 Coke Rep. 31a, ER 971.
214. The Case of Sutton’s Hospital, 10 Coke Rep. 32b ER 973.
215. The Case of Sutton’s Hospital, 10 Coke Rep. 29b ER 968.
216. Harv. L. Sch. MS 114 f. 92r.
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Sir John Croke and George Snigg were the only judges who dissented
from the judgment in favor of the Charterhouse. Their reasoning was
largely technical. Croke believed that the statute had priority and had established a hospital at Hallingbury thus, there was nothing further to give
to the Charterhouse. Moreover, he accepted the argument that the patent
was defective, because while sixteen governors were described by the patent, only fifteen were named.217 Snigg’s recorded comments are short, but
he explained that Sutton had not performed the license and had failed to
appoint a schoolmaster, suggesting the need for a real existence of the corporation.218
The majority reasoned the corporation aggregate was a body politic
that was in partial existence at the time of Sutton’s death and found in
favor of the Hospital.219 They followed the line set out by Baxter’s lawyers, but rejected the more extreme interpretation of the head and body
argument. Specifically, the majority acknowledged that the King was, in
John Dodderidge’s words, the “maker of all corporations.”220 Sutton had
merely pursued the license of the King and he had done so sufficiently to
make the Charterhouse a corporation valid under law. There was, Dodderidge noted, no place certain and only a foundation by implication, but
none of this was essential to an “embryonic” corporation. The King had
incorporated the governors and their successors wanting nothing but the
donation. Although only fifteen were named, this too was sufficient.
Though there was a head without a body at the time of Sutton’s death, their
nomination was enough. A general of an army might have power granted
to them over a body of soldiers, without the host having been summoned.221
Similarly, Edward Bromley observed that a corporation with governors, but without an immediate government, was still valid. The governors
of the Charterhouse were in expectation of government, and they “are the
corporation, they are persons who have the ordering of the government
and have office.”222 Robert Houghton concurred, observing that once the
governors and master were nominated, then this was a body capable in
law.223 Governors should, in fact, be created prior to that which they should
have authority over. The place certain and the hospital house were not of
the essence of a corporation though they were elements that were
217. Cambridge U. Libr. MS Hh.ii.2, f. 109r.
218. Cambridge U. Libr. MS Hh.ii.2, f. 110v.
219. Coke’s reasoning is not described in detail, but one manuscript report indicates that he
spoke “to the same intent” as the majority. Cambridge U. Libr. MS Hh.ii.2, f. 112r.
220. Cambridge U. Libr. MS Hh.ii.2, f. 108r.
221. Cambridge U. Libr. MS Hh.ii.2, f. 109r.
222. Cambridge U. Libr. MS Hh.ii.2, f. 109r.
223. Cambridge U. Libr. MS Hh.ii.2, f. 107v, and Harv. L. Sch. MS 114, f. 111r.
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ultimately necessary. Augustine Nicholls agreed and noted that this was a
corporation with the nomination of the master: in consideration of its future government this was a good corporation in the present.224 James Altham and Laurence Tanfield adopted the same line of reasoning.225 Altham
clearly asserted that the masters made up the corporation and cited prior
cases where there were no lands attached to the corporation, but there were
nonetheless governors.226 Tanfield argued that although there was a need
for a place certain, the naming of the governors and the master was the
founding. Only one manuscript report mentions Coke’s comments from
the bench, and it is brief, noting that he spoke to the same “intent” as the
others.
The reasoning of the majority of the judges suggests that they believed that government was essential to the existence of the corporation.
Baxter’s counsel had claimed that Sutton’s incorporation was incomplete
at his death because it lacked government. These lawyers and judges
shared the same taken-for-granted belief about the purpose of corporations
in their society that had been debated in numerous cases prior to Sutton’s
Hospital. What is less evident is the extent to which religious ideas ultimately legitimated these assumptions and wrapped even early business
corporations within an “economic theology.”227
THE ECONOMIC THEOLOGY OF CORPORATE GOVERNMENT
Nicholas Fuller’s invocation of the Bible in the Case of Monopolies
mentioned above was a reminder that contemporaries framed even economic activities within their wider religious values.228 When the judges
and lawyers referred to corporate government, and keeping trades and people in order, they were repeating cultural truisms articulated in sermons
before them at assizes, in popular advice books, and in religious and political disputation. Corporate government was, in fact, naturalized within a
nested, taken-for-granted scheme, of providential organization that was
thought necessary to social order. Persons across the political spectrum—
whether defenders of the royal supremacy or their Catholic critics—

224. Cambridge U. Libr. MS Hh.ii.2, f. 107v-108r.
225. Cambridge U. Libr. MS Hh.ii.2, f. 107v-108r; 111r-v.
226. Cambridge U. Libr. MS Hh.ii.2, f. 110r.
227. Economic theology is an emerging area of study that explores “the role that theology played
in shaping economic concepts and the social presence of the sacred in economic life.” Stefan Schwarzkopf, Introduction, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC THEOLOGY 1 (Stefan Schwarzkopf
ed., 2020).
228. See Ecclesiastes 3:13 (King James); Darcy v. Allen, Noy 179, 74 ER 1131, 1137 (1602).
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lawyers or non-professionals; and both clerics and lay people, believed in
the theological warrant of social order created by forms of government.229
Historians have long noticed the period’s concern with social order
and the religious foundations of this preoccupation. W.H. Greenleaf provided the classic examination when he investigated early modern England’s “world-view of order which was fundamentally based on a Christian-inspired metaphysic.”230 This “world-view” assumed fundamental
correspondences between the divine, natural, and human worlds. According to Greenleaf, the commitment to this social order and its religious
foundations were used to buttress “absolute monarchy”231 and fell into decay with the growth of skepticism and the empiricism of writers like Francis Bacon (the lawyer and natural philosopher).
This worldview underscored the necessity of active government in
the reproduction of social order. As church theologians, such as St. Augustine had taught, government was necessary to produce social order because of the inherent sinfulness of humans.232 Order would not simply occur through self-regulation by individuals or their natural harmony. God
had therefore implanted a desire for government among people. Humans
and animals, even the natural world, instinctively sought after it.233 Hence
the prominent clergyman Robert Bolton could preach to the judges at assize that “Government is a goodly thing,” and was natural to humans.234
Government produced order and order was deemed essential both to the
natural world and to human society – it was “the greate[s]t happine[ss][]
of life.”235 In a sermon preached before James I, John Buckeridge, later
bishop of Ely, explained that, “Order is the good of e[v]ery creature”236
from which flowed the benefits of “Peace, Protection, [J]u[s]tice, Religion
and the like, which man receives by go[v]ernment . . . .”237
229. See JOHANN P. SOMMERVILLE, ROYALISTS AND PATRIOTS: POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN
ENGLAND 1603–1640, at 18–23 (1999).
230. W.H. GREENLEAF, ORDER, EMPIRICISM AND POLITICS: TWO TRADITIONS OF ENGLISH
POLITICAL THOUGHT 1500-1700, at 8 (1964); Keith Wrightson, Two Concepts of Order: Justices,
Constables and Jurymen in Seventeenth-Century England, in AN UNGOVERNABLE PEOPLE? THE
ENGLISH AND THEIR LAW IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 21–46 (John Brewer
& John Styles eds., 1980).
231. GREENLEAF, supra note 230, at 56.
232. See ANTHONY MICHAEL C. WATERMAN, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND CHRISTIAN
THEOLOGY SINCE THE ENLIGHTENMENT: ESSAYS IN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 124 (2008).
233. See WILLIAM SCLATER, A SERMON PREACHED AT THE LAST GENERALL ASISE HOLDEN
FOR THE COUNTY OF SOMMERSET AT TAUNTON 3 (1616).
234. ROBERT BOLTON, TWO SERMONS PREACHED AT NORTHAMPTON AT TWO SEVERALL
ASSISES 6 (1635).
235. JOHN BUCKERIDGE, A SERMON PREACHED AT HAMPTON COURT BEFORE THE KINGS
MAIESTIE 19 (1606).
236. Id. at 2.
237. Id. at 3.
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Human government and the order it produced mirrored the deeper
providential ordering that God had inserted into the universe for, as Buckeridge put it, “the Lord calls him[s]elf[], The God of Order, not of
confu[s]ion.”238 Belief in the working of providence was normative in
early modern England and encompassed God’s government of the cosmos.239 This belief included the deity’s implanting of regularity in the
workings of nature (general providence) and their intervention in secular
time to manage that creation (special providence).240 Thus, order resulted
both from God’s “secret disposition” and secondary causes, and by “expre[ss][] warrant of his ordinance.”241
Providence was a sense-making lens, explaining both the fundamental order of the universe as well as specific, otherwise bewildering events.
The motions of natural bodies, such as the sun, the moon, and the seas,
obeyed ordered courses determined by providence.242 Human government
too was a product of providential foresight as an instrument to restrain
human sinfulness and part of the chain of government that (ideally) instilled order and harmony in the universe.243 Lawyers and judges held
these same assumptions about the working and immanence of providence.
When Coke fell from his horse in 1632, he gave thanks in his notebook to
“the providence of almighty God though I was in the greatest danger yet I
had not the least hurt . . . .”244 Although histories of the period’s law are
typically written from a secular context, the judges were themselves
deeply religious people who applied taken-for-granted assumptions from
their culture’s religious context.245
Government depended on hierarchy, and the principle of obedience
and subjection was found among social creatures and the natural world.
There was always a head that ruled and a body that obeyed, language that
was familiar to the judges in Sutton’s Hospital. The point was

238. Id. at 2.
239. See ALEXANDRA WALSHAM, PROVIDENCE IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 2 (1999).
240. Id. at 9–11.
241. SCLATER, supra note 233, at 2.
242. WILLIAM DICKINSON, THE KINGS RIGHT BRIEFELY SET DOWNE IN A SERMON PREACHED
BEFORE THE REUEREND JUDGES AT THE ASSIZES HELD IN READING FOR THE COUNTY OF BERKS B2r
(1619).
243. See THOMAS JACKSON, THE WORKS OF THOMAS JACKSON 311 (1844).
244. Brit. Libr. Harley MS 6687A, f. 16r; See also Dodderidge’s comments on predestination in
Bricklayers and Plasterers of London, 2 Rolle Rep. 391-2. Many judges and common lawyers had
strong religious commitments and worked to reconcile the divine with human law, see Richard J. Ross,
Distinguishing Eternal from Transient Law: Natural Law and the Judicial Law of Moses, No. 217
PAST & PRESENT 79–115 (Nov. 2012).
245. See, for example, the essays in GREAT CHRISTIAN JURISTS IN ENGLISH HISTORY (Mark Hill
& R. H. Helmholz eds., 2017).
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conventionally noted that even in heaven there was hierarchy among the
angels.246 The stars also gave witness to the principles of hierarchy and
obedience that were necessary to order for, “there are greater and le[ss]er
lights, rulers among[s]t the re[s]t . . . .”247 This was held even down to the
structure of the human body, “So ha[d] God tempered him in his fabric[]
and con[s]titution, that we [s]hall [s]ee in e[v]ery part of his nature [s]omething that rules, [s]omething made to be ruled.”248 What was true in heaven
was also true in human society. Human societies did not simply self-regulate, but were prone to dissension and violence without the controlling
hand of government: “men assembled cannot go[v]ern[] them sel[v]es,
[u]nlesse some comma[n]d, some obey, some direct, some be directed: it
follow[s], that this societ[y] ha[s] power to go[v]ern[] itself, and that this
power is also of God.”249 Without government chaos and confusion would
erupt. If the sun and moon were to wander from their courses, “the times
and [s]ea[s]ons of the year[] would blend themselves, by dis-ordered and
confu[s]ed mixture.”250 Government restrained the “unbridled corruption”
251
of humans who were “so prone to blo[o]d and violence . . . ” that left to
their own desires “there will soone be an end of all civill society.”252
These world-views, which served to naturalize government within a
religious frame, underwrote the corporate ideas of the period. Corporate
government produced order in the particular situations of local societies,
markets, companies, and trades. Corporations were one mechanism to facilitate and order the social instinct of humans.253 This instinct came from
both the sense of pleasure from being in the company of others and the
human need to co-operate to provide for economic needs or “profit and
commodit[y].” 254 Humans were dependent on the help of others for their
survival and economic benefit.255 Indeed, providence had divided the resources of the world in such a way as to encourage human commerce,

246. BUCKERIDGE, supra note 235, at 19; CALUBYTE DOWNING, A DISCOURCE OF THE STATE
ECCLESIASTICALL OF THIS KINGDOME68 (1634); MATTHEW KELLISON, THE RIGHT AND
JURISDICTION OF THE PRELATE, AND THE PRINCE 40 (1621).
247. SCLATER, supra note 233, at 3.
248. Id.
249. KELLISON, supra note 246, at 42.
250. BOLTON, supra note234, at 10.
251. See SCLATER, supra note 233, at 3.
252. DICKINSON, supra note 242, at sig. D3r; BOLTON, supra note 234, at 10; EDWARD
BOUGHEN, A SERMON CONCERNING DECENCIE AND ORDER IN THE CHURCH PREACHED AT WOODCHURCH 15 (1638).
253. See KELLISON, supra note 246, at 39–42.
254. Id. at 41.
255. JACKSON, supra note 243, at 310.
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interchange and peace.256 Government was important not only because it
produced a type of order, but by restraining human’s corrupt nature, this
order was productive. Thus, as Bolton explained, government “give[s] opportunity by GODs blessing, for the free exerci[s]e, and full improvement
of all human[] abilities … Trades, traffi[c]k[], law[]s, … all Arts and excellencies thrive and flouri[s]h with much happine[ss]e and succe[ss]e, under the wings and warmth of a godly government.”257
Similar statements, as we have seen, were made in the legal argument
of the period and endured well into the eighteenth century. As one treatise
on law and economic matters noted in 1712 noted: “The same Reason
which appoints general Laws to govern Kingdoms ought to allow particular Laws for governing particular Societies, it being admitted that Discipline is requisite in both.”258 Blackstone likewise linked the origins of the
corporation with government and order, recounting how Numa Pompilius
had first created them in ancient Rome to calm civil strife.259 As they had
in Numa’s time, Blackstone explained that corporations “may establish
rules and orders for the regulation of the whole, which are a sort of municipal laws of this little republic . . . .”260 Corporations were, he claimed,
“political constitutions” for government. The conceptualization of the corporation in Sutton’s Hospital and the implications of corporate government contended over by litigants during the same period, had a long life.
RESEARCH AGENDA: TOWARDS CORPORATE FISSION
This paper’s analysis of Sutton has demonstrated the need to rethink
how corporate history is written to avoid anachronism and teleology, and
to widen the sources that historians and legal scholars rely upon to reconstruct earlier jurisprudence authentically. Early modern lawyers brought
religious and cultural values and ideas to their thinking about corporations
that are largely alien to modern analysis. Corporations were forms of government from which their social responsibility arose. A theological
worldview authorized this belief with taken-for-granted currency among
early modern English lawyers. Can this reconstruction help to think about
corporate history differently? It certainly poses a problem: if early modern
corporations were conceived as forms of government contributing order in
256. ISTVAN HONT, JEALOUSY OF TRADE: INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION AND THE NATIONSTATE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 47–51 (2010); JACOB VINER, THE ROLE OF PROVIDENCE IN THE
SOCIAL ORDER: AN ESSAY IN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 32–54 (1977).
257. BOLTON, supra note 234 at 10–11.
258. LAWS CONCERNING TRADE, AND TRADESMEN 2 (1712), citing Davenant v. Hurdis, Moore
586 (K.B. 1599).
259. BLACKSTONE, supra note 68, at 304. The source was PLUTARCH, PLUTARCH’S LIVES 245
(John Dryden trans., 1700).
260. BLACKSTONE, supra note 68, at 303.
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society, how did the business corporation become primarily a vehicle for
private interest?
The usual answer is that liberalization freed the corporate form from
an outdated framework of government control.261 Yet many corporations
have remained governmental, such as municipal corporations, and others
continue to have public interest functions. From the perspective of a period
when the principal division among corporate types was temporal and lay,
the key change that lay in the future was the division into for-profit and
non-profit corporates during the nineteenth century.
The history of this process is yet to be written. Behind this fission of
corporate types into for-profit and non-profit were certainly practical pressures for changes in business organization. Intellectual shifts, however,
were also important preconditions. They reveal the connection between
corporate law and cultural values. The usefulness of understanding early
modern corporate ideas could extend to recognizing this transformation of
corporate thought. In other words, what would the separation of for-profit
and non-profit corporates look like if we described the process using the
historical perspective of government rather than focusing on the emergence of the modern business corporation?
Since government was thought to be necessary and pervasive
throughout society during the early modern period, contemporaries were
also sensitive to different governmentalities. Political and economic government were the two forms of government: the former being the domain
of public affairs and the latter of private households. The word “economic”
during the period was primarily understood in this sense as the management of a household and the relationships there.262 Early modern writers
found the distinction between political and economic government in Aristotle.263 Economic government was “exercised within the limits of a family” while “political[] over a great societ[y] . . .” and was distinguished by
the nature of its rules.264 Economic government produced order, but within
261. See WILLIAM SCOTT, THE CONSTITUTION AND FINANCE OF ENGLISH, SCOTTISH AND IRISH
JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES TO 1720, at 438 (1910); see also WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 8, 221–22 (Vol 1. 1922); see also H. A. Shannon, The Coming of General
Limited Liability, 2 ECON. HIST. 267, 267–68 (1931); see also BISHOP CARLETON HUNT, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN ENGLAND, 1800–1867 6–9, 116–17 (1936); see
also Butler, supra note 4 at 169–70, 172–73; see also HARRIS, supra note 2, at 9.
262. The term “political economy” likely appeared between 1611–1615, see Richard Drayton,
Foreword, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EMPIRE IN THE EARLY MODERN WORLD vii (S. Reinert &
P. Røge eds., 2013); see also A. M. C. Waterman, The Changing Theological Context of Economic
Analysis Since the Eighteenth Century, 40 HIST. POLIT. ECON. 123 (2008).
263. Xenophon’s Oeconomicus was rarely mentioned though it was available in print in English
during the sixteenth century.
264. WILLIAM TOOKER, OF THE FABRIQUE OF THE CHURCH AND CHURCH-MENS LIVINGS 98
(1604); BARNABE BARNES, FOURE BOOKES OF OFFICES ENABLING PRIVAT PERSONS FOR THE
SPECIALL SERUICE OF ALL GOOD PRINCES AND POLICIES 57 (1606).
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the family: “Christian [E]conom[y], is a doctrine of the right ordering of a
[f]amil[y].”265 The family was meant broadly to encompass the authority
of a husband over a wife, father over children, and master over servant.266
It was a “society” of persons who were “[u]nder the pri[v]ate
go[v]ern[]ment of one.”267 Economic government involved the ordering
and disposing of “those goods which God giueth for the succour & profit
of his creatures” or the private management of people and resources.268
Though of narrower range, economic government preceded political.269 Lawyer John Selden explained that, in the earliest societies, all persons were under “[e]conomi[c] rule” and turned to political government to
resolve disputes among families.270 Economic and political government
were related because they both involved prudence – a word prominent
among the first classical economists – and so the rule of a family was preparation for political knowledge and “the art of skilfull governing & ruling
a multitude of men.”271 Society was a composite of different institutions,
including households and corporations, that exercised these forms of political and economic government: “Family is a part and member of the
Town[] and Cit[y], and the Cit[y] is a part, and member of the whole Common-wealth, or Kingdom[].”272 The essence of nineteenth-century fission
was the migration of business corporations from political to economic
government. Corporations were no longer conceived as forms of political
government with social responsibilities unlike other corporate forms like
towns. Why this shift?
This paper has argued that English lawyers conceptualized corporations through a political-theological lens in which authority was needed to
produce social order. These assumptions changed alongside the transformation of providential ideas about order in the course of the eighteenth
and nineteenth century. This development can be linked to wider intellectual currents and religious ideas. During the eighteenth century the concepts of economy and even of providence began to change. Where providential government had previously involved the intercession of an active
deity, the universe was increasing recognized by natural philosophers as a
265. WILLIAM PERKINS, CHRISTIAN OECONOMIE: OR, A SHORT SURVEY OF THE RIGHT
MANNER OF ERECTING AND ORDERING A FAMILIE ACCORDING TO THE SCRIPTURES 1 (1609).
266. Id. at 164.
267. Id. at 2.
268. PIERRE DE LA PRIMAUDAYE, THE FRENCH ACADEMIE, 526 (1618).
269. See PERKINS, supra note 265, at Epistle Dedicatorie, ff. 3r-3v; see also KELLISON, supra
note 246 at 44.
270. JOHN SELDEN, TITLES OF HONOR BY IOHN SELDEN 2 (1614).
271. See LA PRIMAUDAYE, supra note 268, at 106, 491, 523; see also BARNES, supra note264,
at 57; see also PERKINS, supra note 265, at f. 3r.
272. THOMAS PRESTON, ROGER WIDDRINGTONS LAST REIOYNDER TO MR. THOMAS FITZHERBERTS REPLY, 231 (London, 1619).
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place of self-regulating order. The research of A.M.C. Waterman, Margaret Schabas, and others has shown how this idea of the economy changed
from the late seventeenth into the nineteenth century.273 Through the study
of the natural world or the “economy of nature,” natural philosophers and
political economists discovered self-regulating patterns that they interpreted as placed there by a benevolent deity. These insights were slowly
turned to social analysis and a tendency towards equilibrium could be discerned in the seemingly disordered and self-interested actions of humans.274 Active, interventionist government was no longer needed to regulate markets, but rather, they self-regulated through the transactions of
self-regarding individuals and the “invisible hand.”275
The growth of ideas about the economy as a distinct sphere of human
action were connected with growing knowledge about the natural world
and its “spontaneous order.”276 Instead of signifying God’s transcendent
government over creation, political economists, like Adam Smith, found
providential order to be immanent in nature as a self-balancing system
with which the market might be analogized.277 No longer needing to govern markets in a political, interventionist sense, some corporate types
could intellectually slip into the economic sphere where they governed or
managed private resources and individuals.
This history is still to be written. It would describe the emergence of
the corporate scheme of for-profit and non-profits, the relationship of this
split with underlying intellectual ideas about order and government in society, and analysis of the significance of these changes for legal thought.
Investigations have already begun. One recent writer has suggested that
the for-profit and non-profit split occurred in the second half of the nineteenth century as “corporations increasingly became defined with respect
to profit.”278 A history centered on fission would also direct attention to
the importance of non-profit corporates in shaping broader corporate
ideas. Non-profit corporates continued to function as intermediary
273. KEITH TRIBE, LAND, LABOUR AND ECONOMIC DISCOURSE 80–145 (1978); GILBERT
FACCARELLO, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE: THE ECONOMICS OF PIERRE DE BOISGUILBERT
(1999); Margaret Schabas & Neil De Marchi, Introduction to Oeconomies in the Age of Newton, 35
HIST. POLIT. ECON. 1–13 (2003); MARGARET SCHABAS, THE NATURAL ORIGINS OF ECONOMICS
(2007); Waterman, supra note 262.
274. FACCARELLO, supra note 273, at 13–75; SCHABAS, supra note 273, at 4–5.
275. See, e.g., SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 137.
276. SCHABAS, supra note 273, at 30–34; 80–101.
277. Lisa Hill, The Hidden Theology of Adam Smith, 8 EUR. J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 1–29
(2001); Waterman, supra note 262; A. M. C. Waterman, Economics as Theology: Adam Smith’s
Wealth of Nations, 68 SOUTH. ECON. J. 907–921 (2002); THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC
THEOLOGY, 21–22 (Stefan Schwarzkopf ed., 2020).
278. Jonathan Levy, From Fiscal Triangle to Passing Through: Rise of the Nonprofit Corporation, in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 37–73, 217 (Naomi Lamoreaux & William J.
Novak eds., 2017).
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institutions of political government, serving wider public purposes, and as
vehicles for social causes. The early years of the Republic, for example,
saw debates over the relationship between these corporates and state governments. Thus the pioneering research of Johann Neem on Dartmouth
College has explored how the case revealed concerns over the new realities of factionalized politics and their interference in corporate life.279
Alyssa Penick has similarly illuminated the importance of post-Revolution
disestablishment debates in corporate law cases, noting that, “Many states
sought to level the playing field among denominations by passing general
statutes of incorporation that allowed all religious societies to become incorporated.”280 The consequence, during the nineteenth century, was that
charters for non-profit corporates increasingly allowed for broader public
purposes, and as Neem has argued, “a new conception of civil society in
which independent institutions would pursue their own, and the public’s,
good.”281 A history of corporate fission would compare the relationship of
these changes to those of for-profit corporates and further excavate the
deeper intellectual changes that made these fundamental transformations
in corporate law possible.
CONCLUSION
Baxter lost The Case of Sutton’s Hospital. The next year he is found
begging for the legacy that he had forfeited by contesting the will. The
Archbishop of Canterbury responded that since Baxter “seemeth sorowfull
for his error[,]” the legacy would be granted.282 It may have been in the
self-interest of the governors to quiet Baxter, but it was also a charitable
act that made sense in the different values of the early seventeenth century.
This paper has attempted to bring more historical sources and interpretation to bear on Sutton’s Hospital and the legal concepts about corporation during the period. These new sources offer new evidence about debates over corporate personality and the commitment by the judges in the
case to the idea that the corporation aggregate was a form of government.
The foundation of these ideas during the period of special incorporation
was theological. Government was part of God’s providential scheme and
corporations were a form of political government. This underlying theology explains the association of corporations with the public interest and
279. Johann N. Neem, Politics and the Origins of the Nonprofit Corporation in Massachusetts
and New Hampshire, 1780–1820, 32 NONPROFIT VOLUNT. SECT. Q. 344–65 (2003).
280. Alyssa Penick, From Disestablishment to Dartmouth College v. Woodward: How Virginia’s Fight Over Religious Freedom Shaped the History of American Corporations, L. HIST. REV.
11 (2021).
281. Neem, supra note 279; OLIVER ZUNZ, PHILANTHROPY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 8–43
(2012).
282. Symon Baxters Petition, London Metro. Archives ACC/1876/L/02/60.
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social responsibilities. Yet, there were also significant tensions within the
assumption that corporations were forms of government, especially because companies regulating markets and trade attracted criticisms of selfinterest. As we have seen, during the period of Sutton’s Hospital there
were numerous such cases, and the common law judges attempted to restrict the powers of corporate regulation to avoid self-dealing.
Imagined in this way and using new legal sources, the history of corporate law can be reconstructed along different lines and within shifting
cultural values. Rather than developing straightforwardly alongside mercantilist theory or the business corporation emerging from non-profit corporates, this history emphasizes that the business corporation developed
in tandem with other corporate types until new ideas about self-regulating
markets and spontaneous order emerged. The business corporation could
then become an instrument of economic government or management.
These links between corporate development and wider cultural and religious ideas are suggestive, not only of how the Anglo-American history
of corporate law is remembered in a particular way, but how it can be reremembered. This article is an invitation to rethink this history from these
different perspectives.

